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ABSTRACT

This Article uses recent events and litigation involving Citigroup to ask
whether corporate law as created and enforced by state legislaturesand
courts-such as the legislature and courts of the State of Delaware-is
capable of reducing the possibility of a replay of the recent financial
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crisis. Specifically, after presenting the events at Citigroup as a case
study demonstrating the excessive risk-taking activities of financial
institutions, this Article outlines generally the tools available to the law
to limit the sort of excessive risk-taking that occurred at Citigroup and
elsewhere. These tools include regulation of business activities, capital
requirements, rules for executive compensation, imposing liability on
directors and officers for unreasonable risks, and rules governing the
selection of directors and officers. This Article then divides these tools
into those addressed by banking law (regulation of business activities
and capital requirements), and those for which state corporate law plays
a role (compensation limits, personal liability for unreasonable risks,
and director and officer selection). This Article then uses the results
from the recent Citigroup litigation as a case study in the limited
willingness of state legislatures and courts to use the important tools
allocated, at least in part,to corporate law to curb excessive risk-taking
by financial institutions. Specifically, the article contrasts the weaker
standards and applicationfor finding directors and officers liable for
their inattention to risk in Citigroup with the probable analysis under a
banking law or other regulatory regime. This Article also explains why
this result is inherent in a regime in which directors and shareholders
select which state's corporate law will govern. The article concludes
with a discussion of normative implications.
I. INTRODUCTION

As we survey the wreck of the economy left in the wake of the recent
financial crisis, the question inevitably becomes what to do in order to prevent
another such meltdown. This question, in turn, divides into two subsidiary
inquiries: (1) What substantive rules are necessary to prevent another crisis; and
(2) Who should impose such rules? Consistent with the focus of the symposium
of which this article forms a part, this article looks at one aspect of the latter
question.
The debates over who should impose rules to prevent another financial crisis
tend to focus on agencies that regulate financial institutions (e.g., bank
regulators) and agencies that regulate financial markets (e.g., securities
regulators).' Commentators have given less attention to the role of government
bodies that create and enforce corporate law more generally. The lack of
attention given to those responsible for enforcing corporate laws in preventing a
future financial crisis seems surprising. After all, one would not assume a priori
that corporate law is irrelevant to preventing a crisis involving the collapse or

1. E.g., Damian Paletta, Agencies In a Brawl For Control Over Banks, WALL ST. J, Dec. 18, 2009, at
Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126091986848592805.html.

114

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 23
bailout of major corporations. Indeed, among the potentially more significant
legal actions to date from the recent crisis has been a shareholder derivative
lawsuit seeking to hold the directors of the mega financial firm, Citigroup, liable
under Delaware corporate law for the massive losses suffered by the firm.2
This Article seeks to fill the gap. Specifically, it looks at the role of state
legislatures and courts-such as those of the State of Delaware-which are the
governmental bodies primarily responsible for creating and enforcing corporate
law in the United States. The question is whether these organs of state
government are institutionally capable of deploying corporate laws-the laws
governing the internal affairs of business corporations-to reduce the possibility
of a replay of the recent financial crisis.
The discussion will proceed through a blending of the particular and the
general. Specifically, Part II of this Article will use a review of the activities
within Citigroup as a case study in excessive risk-taking by financial institutions
that led to the recent financial crisis. Part III of this Article will outline generally
the tools available to the law to limit the sort of excessive risk-taking that
occurred at Citigroup and other financial institutions. It will then divide these
tools into those addressed by banking law and those for which state corporate law
may play a role. We will see that tools given in whole or in part to corporate law
constitute potentially important mechanisms in the toolbox available to the law to
curb excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. Part IV will use the results in
the Citigroup litigation as a case study in the limited willingness of state
legislatures and courts to use the tools allocated to corporate law to curb
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. It will explain why the results in
Citigroup are inherent in the structural underpinnings of state-created and
enforced corporate law. The normative implication of this analysis is that,
regrettably, one cannot look to state-created and enforced corporate law-as
opposed to aggressive use of all available tools by banking authorities-to limit
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions.
II. CITIGROUP AS A CASE STUDY IN EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING

The financial crisis climaxing in late 2008 had a number of causes-ranging
from macro-economic conditions of excessive liquidity stemming from low
interest rates and saving imbalances between the United States and Asia, which,
in turn, fueled a bubble in housing prices in the United States; to microeconomic factors of risky borrowing against residential real estate through

2. In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) [hereinafter
Citigroup].
3. E.g., Kenneth E. Scott, The FinancialCrisis: Causes and Lessons: Ending Government Bailouts as
We Know Them: PartI- The Crisis (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stan. Univer., Working Paper No.
67, 2009), available at http://ssrn.conabstract= 1521610.
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subprime loans;4 to conflicts of interest afflicting key gatekeepers, especially
credit rating agencies;' to legal factors flowing from a pervasive deregulatory
6
philosophy. No doubt the relative significance of each of these and other factors
will be debated for some time. For purposes of an article focused on the role of
corporate law in preventing a financial crisis, however, the factor of concern is
excessive risk-taking within financial corporations.! Rather than discuss such
risk-taking in the abstract, it may be useful to describe briefly the events at one
company. Citigroup provides a convenient example.
Citigroup is a bank holding company that operates, through its subsidiaries,
both banking and non-banking financial services businesses-at one time being
the world's largest bank.' In late 2007 and 2008, Citigroup suffered more than
$65 billion worth of losses,' which, coupled with the fear of further losses,
threatened Citigroup's survival. Concerned with damage to the broader economy
from the collapse of such a massive financial institution, the federal government
agreed to a bail-out plan in November 2008.'0 Under the plan, the federal
government invested $20 billion in Citigroup, and also agreed to absorb 90
percent of the losses, beyond the first $29 billion, if Citigroup suffered further
losses in its portfolio of approximately $306 billion in residential and commercial
real estate loans, as well as other assets. To cover these losses, if necessary, the
Treasury Department would use $5 billion of its bailout fund, the FDIC would
cover the next $10 billion, and the Federal Reserve would guarantee the rest. In
exchange, the federal government received preferred stock.
While Citigroup's losses flowed from a number of sources, for present
purposes it is enough to focus on the largest source: mortgage-related securities

4. E.g., Jon Hilsenrath & Luca Di Leo, Fed Chief Edges Closer to Using Rates to Pop Bubbles, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 4, 2010, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.con/article/SBl26253288955613905.html.(Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, in an address to the American Economic Association, blamed the real estate
bubble on mortgages that should not have been extended).
5. E.g., Charles Calomiris, A Recipe for Ratings Reform, 6 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 2 (Nov. 2009),
available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss I 1/art5.
6. E.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis without a Face: Emerging Narrativesof the FinancialCrisis, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1002 (2009).
7. E.g., RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DECENT INTO
DEPRESSION 269 (2009) ("the basic responsibility for the depression rests with the private sector-with
decisions such as Citigroup's to increase the amount of risk in its lending"); Claire Hill & Richard Painter,
Berle's Vision Beyond ShareholderInterests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) PersonalLiability,
U. SEATTLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510443 (excessive risk-taking
at financial institutions led to financial crisis); James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk
Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 731, 732, 745 (2009) (arguing
that failure of risk management in financial corporations contributed to the financial crisis).
8. E.g., Andrew Martin & Gretchen Morgenson, Can Citigroup Carry Its Own Weight?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2009, at BUI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l l/01/business/economy/O1citi.html.
9. E.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made
Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/
23citi.htmi.
10. Eric Dash, Citigroup to Halt Dividend and Curb Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at Al, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ll/24/business/24citibank.html.
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involved with Citigroup's operations in collateralized debt obligations.
Collateralized debt obligations (often referred to as CDOs) are created by
packaging together various secured obligations, such as home loans secured by
mortgages, and then selling rights to the cash flows from the pooled secured
obligations in classes, or tranches. Some of these tranches possess a senior right
to be paid (thereby having less risk of default), while the subordinated tranches
receive a greater interest rate in exchange for taking the greater risk of nonpayment. The prevailing view was that one could create tranches which, because
of their senior position, justifiably could claim even extremely low investmentgrade (such as AAA) levels of risk despite the underlying assets in the pool being
more risky home loans, including subprime loans."
Citigroup engaged in packaging and selling CDOs using not only home loans
it originated, but also home loans it purchased from other lenders, as well as
other secured obligations.
Following Charles Prince (who later became
Citigroup's CEO) taking charge of Citigroup's corporate and investment bank in
2002, Citigroup ramped up its CDO operation so that by the middle of the decade
it became one of the biggest players in generating and selling CDOs. This
produced considerable income for Citigroup, which charged fees for managing

the CDOs.12
This operation not only increased Citigroup's earnings, it also increased its
risks. In part, this was because Citigroup itself invested in CDOs. In part,
however, Citigroup was creating an inventory risk; in other words, the risk that, if
the market for CDOs dried up, Citigroup would be stuck with not only the CDOs
it was creating for sale but also with the various secured obligations, such as
mortgage-backed home loans, that it was generating or buying to package into
CDOs." Moreover, among the secured obligations Citigroup purchased for
packaging into CDOs, which consequently added to its inventory risk, were
CDOs Citigroup issued earlier.14 Compounding the inventory risk to an even
greater degree, Citigroup included a "liquidity put"-an option allowing
purchasers of the CDOs to sell them back to Citigroup at original value-along
with the CDOs it created.
The risk Citigroup faced from holding an inventory of CDOs and securities
for packaging into CDOs, as well as from the obligation to repurchase CDOs sold

11. E.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 954-55 (2009).
12. E.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 9.
13. E.g., Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 113 (for example, Citigroup, in a couple major transactions in 2007,
acquired billions of dollars worth of subprime loans from financially troubled subprime lenders to package into
CDOs).
14. E.g., Martin & Morgenson, supra note 8 (referring to allegations in a class action lawsuit that
Citigroup recycled older CDOs into new CDOs because it could not find buyers for the old CDOs).
15. E.g., Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 113 (it appears from the plaintiffs' complaint in Citigroup that a
staggering $25 billion face value of CDOs-around half of the CDO inventory upon which Citigroup incurred
losses-came from CDOs returned to Citigroup under liquidity puts. In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder
Derivative Litig., Second Amended Complaint, para. 68).
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with liquidity puts, came home to roost in 2007 and 2008 when the housing price
bubble, which peaked in 2006, burst completely; whereupon subprime home loan
defaults accelerated and the market prices for CDOs collapsed. In stages,
Citigroup was forced to recognize losses by writing down the value of its onetime $50 billion plus inventory of CDOs and subprime mortgage-backed home
loans, in many cases to between twenty-one and forty-one cents on the dollar. 6
While Citigroup's losses came from risks taken on the assets side (CDOs and
subprime loans), liabilities incurred to finance the CDOs and subprime loans also
created risks which came back to bite Citigroup. Specifically, Citigroup
established so-called Special Investment Vehicles ("SIV"), which issued
commercial paper-very short-term notes-the proceeds of which were used to
fund subprime loans and CDOs. The risk thereby created was that very shortterm borrowing was funding long-term investments, which was acceptable so
long as the investments were safe and liquid. When these investments became
devalued and illiquid, the SIVs could not repay the commercial paper. While
Citigroup claimed it was not legally obligated to do so, it nevertheless made
emergency transfers of funds into the SIVs and ultimately assumed the assets and
liabilities of the SIVs."
The fact that Citigroup took business risks in search of profits, and that those
business risks led to losses, would be unexceptional-except perhaps for the
magnitude of the misadventure. What is important is whether there are facts to
suggest that persons within Citigroup acted unreasonably, even without the
benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, in incurring these risks. If so, then it
becomes useful to discuss how the law might seek to prevent persons from taking
unreasonable risks.
Based upon reports of investigative journalists and review by regulators,
there are grounds to believe that Citigroup's misfortune was not simply the result
of bad luck following the pursuit of reasonable business risks. Specifically,
Citigroup had risk management systems in place designed to prevent its
executives-including the executives who allowed the dangerous build-up in its
inventory of CDOs and subprime loans to occur-from taking unreasonably
dangerous risks. However, a serious flaw apparently in Citigroup's risk
management systems was a lack of independence of the risk managers from the
executives whom the risk managers were supposed to monitor, both because of
long standing personal connections" and because of lines of authority under

16. E.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 9.
17. E.g., Citigroup, 964 A.2d at I13.
18. For example, the senior risk officer at Citigroup who was responsible for overseeing risks involved
in Citigroup's CDO operations had long-standing friendships both with the head of the division undertaking the
CDO operation and with the Citigroup executive who oversaw the build-up in Citigroup's inventory of CDOs
and related securities. This relationship, according to accounts, raised eyebrows of those concerned about risk
controls at Citigroup and it was said that Citigroup traders who wanted to undertake profitable but risky deals
could take advantage of this relationship to convince the senior risk officer that the risk was worth taking. E.g.,
Dash & Creswell, supra note 9.
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which risk managers reported to the person with an interest in promoting the
activities they were monitoring. 9 Further, as discussed above, Citigroup's
biggest risk came, not so much from individual risky transactions, as it did from a
buildup in its overall inventory of CDOs and subprime securities; these became
particularly dangerous the minute there were signs of a slow down in the real
estate market. Citigroup officials do not seem to have accompanied this
dangerous buildup with any independent assessment of the risk it entailed, but
simply relied blindly on favorable credit ratings given to CDOs. 20 Potentially
embarrassing along this line, reports surfaced that the most senior officers and
directors at Citigroup may not have been informed enough to be aware of the
magnitude of the risk Citigroup was running in its CDO operations. 2 1 Regulatory
actions give credibility to the press reports of Citigroup's risk management
failings. Complaints by foreign regulators that Citigroup's risk management
practices were dangerously lax led the Federal Reserve to bar Citigroup from
making any acquisitions of other financial companies for twelve months between
the spring of 2005 and 2006.22 In 2008, Federal Reserve examiners apparently
gave Citigroup a scathing confidential review of its risk management practices.23
Citigroup's losses seem to have resulted not only from a lack of brakes.(as in
a well-functioning risk management system) but also from too much steam in the
engine (as in the focus on profits and bonuses). This ran from former Clinton
Administration Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, who, as Chairman of the
Citigroup Board of Directors' Executive Committee, urged engagement in
greater risks for greater profits; to Charles Prince, who pushed the expansion of
the CDO operation to gain increased profits; to the persons running Citigroup's
CDO trading operations, who, because of bonuses geared to profits, became
among Citigroup's highest paid employees. According to some at Citigroup, this
created a culture in which those worried about the buildup of risk kept quiet. 24

19. At one point, the risk managers not only reported to the senior risk officer, but also reported to the
head of the division undertaking the CDO operation-which placed the risk managers in the awkward position
of reporting to the person whose division's risk-taking they were supposed to be keeping in check. Keep in
mind that the purpose for having risk managers is because traders and the manager of their division have an
incentive to take excessive risk. Id.
20. E.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 9.
21. E.g., Id (Citigroup CEO Charles Prince never questioned the risk entailed in Citigroup's CDO
operation before an emergency meeting when it was too late to avoid huge losses, because no one had warned
him); Eric Dash, Citigroup DirectorExpected to Quit Key Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008 (reporting on
pressure for the chairman of the Audit and Risk Management Committee of Citigroup's board of directors to
resign for failing of oversee Citigroup's risk management practices, and that, according to people familiar with
the matter, some Citigroup directors were not aware of Citigroup's CDO loss exposure until huge write-downs
started piling up).
22. E.g., Martin & Morgenson, supra note 8.
23. E.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 9.
24. Id.
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HI. TOOLS FOR CURBING EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING AND THE ROLE OF
CORPORATE LAW
A. The Tools for Curbing Excessive Risk-Taking
To explore the potential role for corporate law in curbing excessive risktaking, such as occurred at Citigroup, it is useful to step back and take an
inventory of the key mechanisms available to the law to address the problem.
There are at least five basic approaches.
1. Regulation of Business Activities
The most obvious approach for the law to take to limit excessive risk-taking
by financial institutions is to enact and enforce rules regulating the activities
whereby financial companies incur risk. For example, to limit the risk that the
failure of one borrower would ruin a bank, banking law prohibits a bank from
lending more than a certain percentage of its assets to a single borrower.2 For
many years, concerns about the risks banks would face if engaged in securities
transactions led Congress, in the Glass-Steagall Act, to limit the ability of banks
to engage in the securities business.26 This limit on potential risk substantially
departed the scene in a much-noted symptom of increasing deregulation. 27 An
obvious lesson from the role of "no-doc loans" in the recent financial crisis is the
need to enforce rules requiring adequate documentation of the borrower's
earnings capability before making a home loan.2" A more controversial lesson
from the recent crisis could be the need to limit the use of certain derivative
contracts, such as credit default swaps.29 Regulation of business activities to curb
excessive risk-taking can preclude the firm from engaging in certain risky
activities; it can alternately leave decisions to the firm but mandate certain
processes, such as the establishment of risk management committees, designed to
avoid ill-considered risks.30

25. E.g., CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 77-78 (2d ed., Juris
Publishing, Inc. 2006).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (preventing national banks from underwriting most types of securities). 12
U.S.C. § 335 (2006) (extending the prohibition on underwriting to state banks). 12 U.S.C. § 377 (2006)
(preventing affiliation of banks with firms engaged in underwriting securities).
27. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 504, 113 Stat. 1439 (1999) (repealing 12 U.S.C.
§ 377, thereby allowing affiliation with underwriters, but not underwriting of securities, by banks).
28. E.g., Robert E. Litan, Whither FinancialReform?, 6 EcoNOMISTs' VOICE 1 (Oct. 2009), available
at http://www.bepress.comlev/vol6/iss 1l/art8.
29. E.g., Andrew M. Kulpa, Minimal Deterrence: The Market Impact, Legal Fallout, and Impending
Regulation of CreditDefault Swaps. 5 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 293 (2009).
30. E.g., Martin Lipton, Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION, Dec. 17, 2009, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2009/12/17/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-2/#more-5811 (referring to proposals before Congress
to require independent risk committees responsible for the establishment and evaluation of risk management
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Since the purpose of this Article is to look at the role of corporate law in
preventing a financial crisis, it is not necessary to go beyond these few examples
and delve into extensive details on the regulation of business activities of
financial firms. Such regulation, however, raises a couple of broad questions that
are important to answer in order to consider the role of corporate law in this
realm.
To begin with, it is useful to ask what justifies the regulation of the business
activities of banks and other financial firms so as to limit their risk. After all, in
seeking to prevent the sort of excessive risk-taking that might cause the failure of
regulated financial institutions, these regulations seem quite different than most
regulations the government imposes on business entities. Specifically, when
dealing with worker health and safety, consumer protection, environmental
regulations, and the like, it is easy to imagine that if left unregulated, business
entities would happily sacrifice the interests of their employees, customers and
the environment to make extra profit for the owners. By contrast, when the law
acts to prevent a financial institution from taking excessive risk, it seeks to
prevent actions that could wipe out the owners' interests in the firm. Of course,
the law is not trying to protect the owners. Rather it is trying to protect
depositors, or the taxpayers in the case of deposit insurance, or the broader
economy from the injury resulting from the collapse of financial institutions."
Yet, this does not answer the question of why the self-interest of the owners in
avoiding failure does not provide adequate protection.
There are a couple of answers to this question. To begin with, the owners
(the shareholders in a corporation) are not commonly the persons making the
decisions regarding risk-taking. Particularly in the widely held company,
managers, over whom shareholders may have limited practical influence, will be
making the decisions.32 Concededly, managers may have strong incentives to
avoid business failure-depending particularly on their prospects for alternate
employment and how much of their personal wealth is tied up in the company's
stock. 3 Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that the managers' precise
calculus of costs and gains from risk-taking matches either the shareholders' or
those of the broader society.3
More fundamentally, there are very strong reasons to question whether the
shareholders' views of acceptable risk match what is socially optimal. In fact, an
examination of the stock market performance of shares in financial companies in
the years leading up to the recent financial crisis shows that the stock market
practices to be formed at large financial companies).
31. E.g., John Cassidy, An Economist's Invisible Hand, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2009, at W3, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704204304574545671352424680.html.
32. This observation is commonly known as the "Berle-Means thesis" after the authors of the classic
work which pointed out the phenomenon. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
33. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEo. L. J. 247 (2010).
34. Id. at 265-267.
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rewarded the shares of banks and financial firms, including Citigroup, that took
what turned out to be excessive risks, while punishing the shares of more prudent
institutions." The existence of bank regulation is based upon the recognition of
the moral hazard that inflicts a business whose essence is making money by
risking other peoples' (depositors') money. While bank shareholders do not want
their firms to fail, taking a risk in search of higher profits can make sense for the
shareholders even when the risk no longer makes economic sense once one
factors in the greater amount of depositors' money potentially lost. 6 Moreover, a
highly significant (as illustrated by recent events) externality, presumably
ignored by shareholders, is the systemic damage caused to the broader economy
by the failure of large banks."
Moving beyond the question of whether regulation is necessary, we must ask
whether regulation of business activities by financial institutions is a sufficient
legal tool to curb excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. If so, then there
is little need for corporate law to play a role in seeking to avoid a financial crisis.
Noted economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has provided insights into the limits of
regulation as a tool to control negative corporate impacts on society." He begins
by asking why governments, including the United States' government, are
concerned about sovereign investment funds (funds investing on behalf of
foreign governments) acquiring controlling interests in corporations operating
businesses in sensitive fields. If regulation of corporations is sufficient to ensure
companies refrain from actions that create negative impacts, then corporate
ownership and control, including by other countries, should not matter. The
answer, Stiglitz concludes, is that governments recognize that ownership and
control matter despite regulation. This is because regulation can never be
complete. Those in charge of the corporation invariably have some freedom of
action due to inevitable gaps in the regulations, or because the regulator cannot
be present at all times. This means those in control of corporations can take
actions that create negative consequences despite the best regulation.
35. William W. Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 653, 704-709 (2010).
36. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33, at 256-73.
37. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Capitalism in Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A 17, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl24165301306893763.html. One might also ask whether the self-interest of the
financial institution's creditors will lead creditors to prevent the institution from taking excessive risk. Writers
sometimes blame deposit insurance for creating moral hazard by removing the insured depositors' incentive to
monitor banks against dangerous risk-taking. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate
Governance of Banks, 9 FRBNY EcON. POL'Y REv. 91, 98 (2003) available at http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/epr/03v09nl/0304mace.html. The problem, of course, is that the threat of a bank run by illinformed depositors, who might be reacting as much to the danger of the run as they are to poor investments of
the bank, seems a crude tool to discourage excessive risk-taking that the depositors will be the last people to
discover. E.g., Peter 0. Milbert, CorporateGovernance of Banks 10, 13 (ECGI - Law Working Paper No.130,
2009), http://ssm.com/abstract=1448118. For an explanation as to why bondholders in the bank lack sufficient
incentives to address excessive risk-taking, see Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33, at 268-71.
38. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 101 AM.
Soc'Y OF INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 3, 45-46 (2007).
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2. Capital Requirements
A second type of law aimed at curbing excessive risk imposes capital
requirements on financial institutions. In this context," and simplifying a great
deal, the law defines a basket of items-such as the amount received for common
and preferred stock, certain retained earnings and reserves, as well as the amount
received for some types of debt instruments-as capital. The law then demands
that capital constitute a percentage-which depends upon the nature of the
capital and of the firm's assets-of the financial firm's total assets.4
Capital requirements provide a cushion to help insure that a financial
institution can still meet its obligation to depositors despite losses in its
investment and lending portfolio. 41 This affect of capital, however, mitigates the
consequences of excessive risk-taking; it does not curb it. The way in which
capital serves to curb excessive risk-taking is by addressing the moral hazard that
results if shareholders can make money by risking the depositors' money without
42
By ensuring that shareholders have
suffering the consequences of any losses.
some "skin in the game," capital seeks to alleviate the moral hazard.
As with regulation of business activities, the question arises whether capital
requirements in banking law can be sufficient in themselves to curb excessive
risk-taking, thereby precluding the need for corporate law to play a role. There
are several reasons to conclude capital requirements are not sufficient. To begin
with, capital requirements work on the incentives of shareholders, but, as
discussed above, managers make decisions regarding risk-taking.
More fundamentally, capital requirements have had limited success in
forcing the shareholders to focus on excessive risk to a socially optimal level-as
illustrated in the earlier discussion of the stock performance of banking and

39. General corporate law has some, largely minimal, capital rules. See infra note 83.
40. E.g., ALFRED M. POLLARD & JOSEPH P. DALY, BANKING LAW INTHE UNITED STATES § 11.02 (3rd
ed. 2009).
41. E.g., Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for
Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1313 (1989). By contrast, reserve
requirements-in other words, the requirement that some portion of the bank's assets from deposits or capital
be held and not loaned out-serve somewhat different functions. One is a matter of monetary policy as such
reserves reduce the amount of money in circulation. The other is to address a timing problem. Banking involves
a mismatch between the bank's assets in the form of long-term loans, and the bank's obligations in the form of
short-term deposits. Reserves provide a cushion to help ensure banks can cover withdrawals of short term
deposits despite the delays entailed in waiting for payments on their long-term loans. E.g., Pollard & Daly,
supra note 40, at § 11.03. None of this, however, is really relevant to the general riskiness of the financial
institution's investments and lending.
42. E.g., Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, Credit Market Competition and Capital
Regulation, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION, Sept. 9, 2009,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/12/1 1/credit-market-competition-and-capital-regulation/#more-5965.
The impact of capital requirements on moral hazard may be particularly important given the presence of deposit
insurance, since the existence of such insurance may allow banks with little or no capital-where the moral
hazard problem is the greatest-to still attract deposits. E.g. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 37, at 98.
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financial companies in the years leading up to the recent panic. Several factors
may account for this.
For one, capital rules involve an inherent complexity which undercuts their
effectiveness. A key purpose of the capital requirement is to deal with the
prospect that bad loans and investments will mean that the institution's assets are
not worth what was thought; yet central to applying the capital requirement is the
value of the institution's assets. 43 The effort to square this circle-for instance,
by making the required capital depend upon the riskiness of the assets held by the
bank-may lead to gaming and unintended consequences. 45 For example, the
presumably less risk entailed with AAA rated securitized investments, as
opposed to individual mortgage backed home loans, has meant a lower capital
requirement for banks that hold more of their assets in AAA rated securitized
investments than that required for banks holding more of their assets in the form
of individual home loans.4 This, in turn, may have led banks to place a premium
on holding AAA rated senior tranches of CDOs rather than individual home
loans.47 As discussed earlier, these CDOs turned out to be a major source of
Citigroup's multi-billion dollar losses; indeed, the added complexities of valuing
and dealing with these securitized instruments in a collapsing housing market
may have added a significant element of unexpected riskiness over individual
mortgage-backed home loans.48
Capital requirements may also create a perverse effect.
Since the
shareholders have a greater investment, return on the investment will go down
unless loans and other investments give a greater return. This may produce an
incentive to take greater risks.49
Finally, the effectiveness of the shareholders' capital investment in curbing
the shareholders' appetite for excessive risk depends upon forcing the
shareholders to internalize the societal cost of the financial institution's failure.
One problem here is that this depends upon the shareholders' planning horizons.
Despite capital requirements, shareholders with only a short-term planning
horizon-in other words, shareholders only focused on near-term corporate profit
performance-may be favorably disposed toward excessively risky behavior by
financial firms when the likely positive result is near-term and the possible
negative consequences are of sufficiently small probability that they are unlikely
to occur within the planning horizon (the so-called black swan event). Such
E.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 20.
E.g., MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 5.3.3.4.2 (Supp. 2009).
45. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33, at 286-87.
46. E.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 20.
47. E.g., Jeffrey Friedman, Bank Pay and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009, at A21,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574429293838639418.html.
48. E.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 10-11, 16.
49. E.g., Norton, supra note 41, at 1313; MUlbert, supra note 37 at 14. Adjusting the capital
requirements for the riskiness of the bank's assets should decrease this incentive (id)-albeit, this increases the
complexity problem with capital requirements.
43.

44.
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short-term planning horizons exist among many institutional investors (e.g.,
mutual funds) in substantial part because the actual decision-makers in such
investors are managers whose compensation may depend more on the short-term
performance of individual portfolio companies than on the long-term."o Beyond
the timing issue, there is the inherently large difference in the magnitude of what
shareholders have to lose and the losses faced by depositors despite any
reasonable capital requirement. The mathematics of banking are such that,
unless one makes the capital requirement so large as to undercut the banking
function altogether, investments that are not in the interests of depositors still
could make sense for the shareholders despite the risk to their capital.'
Compounding this problem, the cost of a bank's collapse may be the systemic
damage caused to the broader economy, which could even exceed the depositors'
losses."
3. CompensationRules
Sources from politicians to academic commentators have given considerable
attention to the possible role of executive compensation in encouraging excessive
risk-taking by financial institutions." The large size of executive compensation
at financial firms has caught the public's attention,54 but this, in itself, is not the
concern when it comes to excessive risk. The fact that executives who brought
their firms to collapse nevertheless received such compensation begins to get to
the problem, but we need to be more precise. The question is: What incentives
does compensation create for executives as they make decisions through which
the financial institution incurs risks as it seeks profits?
The very fact that executives, who so miserably failed, nevertheless received
rewards presumably has some affect on incentives. Yet, while such a no-fault
system provides little carrot for good performance, it would not seem, at least on
its own, to promote the pursuit of excessive risk. One possible exception would
be when the laxity, potentially encouraged by such a compensation scheme,
applies to persons (say members of the risk management department or of the
board of directors) whose essential role lies in monitoring risk-taking by others.
Still, this has not been the central focus of concern.

50. E.g., Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Shareholders: Partof the Solution or Part of the Problem?, THE
ATLANTIC, Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/shareholders-partof-the-solution-or-part-of-the-problem/29188/.
51. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supranote 33, at 256-63 (giving examples).
52. See supra note 37.
53. E.g., Helia Ebrahimi, Sarkozy Draws Up Plansfor Global Bonus Clampdown, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 26, 2009, at 2, available at 2009 WLNR 16614995; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano,
Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparencyand Committing to the Long-term 3-4, (Yale L.
& Econ. Research Paper No. 393, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1506742.
54. E.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Martin Zimmerman, Bank bonuses are in Fed's cross hairs, L. A. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://articles.1atimes.com/2009/oct/23/business/fi-exec-pay23.
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Much of the expressed concern has focused on the skewed incentives created
by the timing structure common to executive compensation schemes, which grant
rewards based upon earnings performance during a relatively short time (such as
a year or a quarter)." The simple bonus based on earnings during a given
accounting period creates the incentive to increase earnings during this period.
Stock option plans add to the bonus incentive-to the extent the amount of the
option grant depends on reported earnings-the additional incentive to increase
earnings during current accounting periods because the market price of stock
upon which the value of the option depends is highly responsive to near-term
reported earnings.16 The corporate scandals of 2001-2002 involving accounting
fraud at Enron, Worldcom and the like illustrated the incentives this system
creates for gaming reported earnings during a given accounting period.17 The
financial panic of 2008 may illustrate the incentive this system creates for
improving earnings during a given accounting period by way of decisions
involving unreasonably high levels of risk.
The problem is not simply that executives have the firm incur risk in order to
achieve earnings-this is what such schemes hope to achieve." Rather, the
problem is that such schemes create asymmetric incentives under which the
executives take unreasonable risk because they gain benefit from increased
reported earnings during the given accounting period yet do not suffer equal
consequences from losses.- The asymmetry results from the fact that there is no
negative bonus or stock option under which the executive must pay the company
for accounting periods in which there are losses. This "heads-I-win, tails-whocares" approach makes it rational to place a bet even if the odds of winning, or
the payoff if one wins, would not make this a worthwhile bet with one's own
money. This becomes even worse if the loss event has very low probability-a
black swan event-in which case, the executive might figure that the odds of
such an event occurring within the period of time the executive cares about (say,
before he or she moves on to another position) is so small as to ignorei 0 Yet, as
recent events show, even the risk of a black swan event can be excessive if the
magnitude of harm is great enough.

55. E.g., Bhagat & Romano, supra note 53, at 4; Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid,
and,if so, What ifAnything Should be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1034-37 (2009).
56. E.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 35, at 38-39.
57. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modem
Business Corporation:Some InitialReflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1246-47 (2002).
58. See David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay 10
(Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 09-22, 2009), available at http://ssm.coml abstract= 1396663
(incentive compensation schemes are designed to deal with the problem of excessive conservatism by
managers).
59. E.g., Milbert, supra note 37 at 13, E.g., Posner, supra note 55, at 1026. It is also worth noting that
the opaque quality of a bank's assets can render it difficult for those outside management to judge the degree to
which increased earnings reported by management seeking a bonus simply resulted from increasing the risk
profile of the assets, as opposed to superior acumen.
60. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 38, at 49-50.
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While most attention has focused on this timing issue, Professors Lucian
Bebchek and Holger Spamann have noted an additional incentive problem
regarding the encouragement of excessive risk that may arise from the
compensation of financial firm executives.6 ' As discussed above, shareholders of
financial firms have an incentive to take excessive risks insofar as most of the
loss falls on depositors. Hence, executive compensation schemes-such as ones
that pay in part with stock or stock options-designed to align executive interests
with those of the shareholders may contribute to the incentives of executives
taking excessive risks. Indeed, to the extent stock options allow executives to
enjoy the upside potential of gains for the stockholders without the downside
risks of holding stock, they further skew the incentives of executives toward
excessive risk.
There are those who have challenged the thesis that incentives based upon
executive compensation increased the danger to financial firms. Correlation
studies comparing forms of compensation and how financial firms fared in the
crisis have provided ammunition for both sides.6 ' Resolving who has the better
of the argument, however, is well beyond the scope of this Article.
If, in fact, certain forms of executive compensation have encouraged
excessive risk-taking, then rules limiting the use of these forms of executive
compensation become a useful tool in curbing excessive risk-taking. However,
as conceded by the advocates of such rules," this approach is unlikely to be
sufficient, standing alone, to curb excessive risk-taking.
4. Liabilityfor UnreasonableRisks
Imposing liability to pay the damages resulting from unreasonable risks is a
conventional tool in the law to deter creating such risks. Indeed, this concept is a
pillar of tort law. While one goal of tort recovery for negligence (taking
unreasonable risks) is compensation for injured parties, another goal is to deter
negligent conduct.65
Interestingly, there do not appear to be many empirical studies on the degree
to which fear of liability for unreasonable risk has changed the conduct of
corporate directors and executives. Nevertheless, those in the field operate on the
assumption that such an impact exists. Indeed, as expressed in Citigroup, as well

61. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33, at 264-65.
62. E.g., Friedman,supra note 47.
63.
For a description of the major studies that potentially cast doubt on the impact of executive
compensation in leading to excessive risk-taking by financial firms, see Bhagat & Romano, supra note 53, at
n.3; Friedman, supra note 47. For a contrary view of the significance of these studies, see Bebchuk & Spamann,
supra note 33, at 270-72.
64. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33, at 293.
65. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 (2000).
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67

as numerous other court opinions" and academic commentary, the fear is that
legal liability may overly deter risk-taking by directors and executives.
Of course, by definition, imposition of liability for taking unreasonable risks
should not create liability for those who only create reasonable risks; therefore,
as a first approximation, liability should not deter reasonable risk.' Hence, the
concern about over-deterrence is based on either a supposition that there will be
erroneous determinations of liability or the hypothesis that executives will avoid
even reasonable risk for fear of erroneous determination of liability, or just to
avoid the burden of being sued. It is useful to note, however, that this overdeterrence concern raises a challenge to the wisdom of much of tort law, and not
just to liability for risk-taking by financial firm executives.o Still, as discussed
later, in reaction to the concern of over-deterring business risk-taking, corporate
law commonly requires greater culpability than simply unreasonable conduct
before finding liability-a doctrine referred to as the business judgment rule.
In any event, the impact of monetary liability is, to some extent, the flip side
of the impact of compensation schemes that reward profit creation. If
compensation based on company profits may encourage excessive risk, then
paying damages in the event of losses from unreasonable actions should
discourage excessive risk-taking. The degree to which the possible imposition of
liability deters risk depends upon well-established factors: the magnitude of
liability and the probability of its imposition." These, in turn, depend upon both
the substantive standards for imposing liability and the procedural rules that may
facilitate or hinder prosecution of the claim. So, for example, procedural rules
that facilitate private actions may increase deterrence by increasing the
probability of sanction.72
Finally, it should be noted that liability for
unreasonable risks may fall on both those who unreasonably decided to take the
risk and upon those whose job it was to prevent engagement in unreasonable

E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
E.g., David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 653, 683 (1984).
68. Applying Judge Hand's famous formula from United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947), adjusted for investments rather than accident avoidance, if the magnitude of gain expected
from an investment decision multiplied by its probability of occurring exceeds the magnitude of loss risked by
the investment decision multiplied by its probability of occurring than the investment is reasonable (ignoring
the opportunity costs of competing investments).
69. E.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 51 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 945, 963 (1990).
70. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 307-312 (1994).
71. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
66.

67.

CRIMINOLOGY 395, 442 (1997).

72. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964) (court implied a private right of action
for violation of SEC rule against false statements in proxy solicitation, in part, to aid enforcement by catching
violations the SEC lacks the resources to detect).
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risks but unreasonably allowed the risk to be taken. The events at Citigroup,
discussed above, seemingly illustrate both types of conduct.
5.

Selection of Management (Rules of CorporateGovernance)

Rules impacting selection of corporate management may also provide a
means to curb excessive risk-taking. Here, we are concerned with rules affecting
the selection of those who decide whether the financial company will incur risks,
the selection of those who supervise those who decide whether the financial
company will incur risks, and even the selection of those who choose those who
have these other roles. Such rules may help if they are able to address a couple
of ways selection can either limit or foster excessive risk-taking.
Selection can influence excessive risk-taking to the extent such risk-taking
results from incompetence (as opposed to rational responses to bad incentives).
In fact, there is some reason to believe that lack of financial competence played a
role in the financial crisis. A study of German state-owned banks by Professor
Harald Hau found a statistically significant inverse correlation between the
financial sophistication possessed by members of the bank supervisory boards
and how poorly the banks did during the recent financial crisis; in other words,
the less financial sophistication (as measured by various criteria) members of the
board possessed, the worse the bank generally fared." On a more anecdotal level,
references to the lack of knowledge in the field of CDOs possessed by Charles
Prince, the Citigroup senior executive and then CEO who pushed Citigroup's
unfortunate lunge into such investments,74 raise the question as to what role lack
of competence may have played in Citigroup's problems.
The other impact of selection on risk-taking involves incentives. Desire for
advancement or fear of firing can discourage excessive risk-taking if executives
perceive that those controlling appointments and removal will hold losses against
the executives. On the other hand, desire for advancement or fear of firing can
encourage excessive risk-taking if executives perceive that those controlling
appointments and removal are more concerned with earnings than risk. This
prospect, in turn, ties into the discussion of the incentives of bank shareholderswho elect the directors." As explained above, shareholders have incentives to
favor excessive risk-taking.
This discussion suggests that rules setting qualifications of financial
competence for election to the board or appointment as an executive, or allowing
73. Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private Vs. Public
Banks in Germany, 24 (CESifo Group, Working Paper No. 2640, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1360698. See also Millbert, supra note 37, at 22-23 (citing evidence of favorable correlation between
financial expertise of board chair and bank performance).
74. Dash & Creswell, supra note 9 (quoting a former Citigroup executive as saying that Charles Prince
"didn't know a CDO from a grocery list").
75. E.g., Model Business Corporation Act § 7.28 (2003) (for corporations generally); 12 U.S.C. § 71
(2000) (for national banks).
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removal and a bar from future service in case of incompetence, might limit
excessive risk-taking. Rules mandating disclosure of financial qualifications of
candidates to the board might also promote competence-assuming disclosure
More controversially, the
actually affects either voting or nominations.
discussion above suggests that rules limiting the effectiveness of the shareholder
electoral franchise might reduce excessive risk-taking. For example, as a radical
thought, one might consider giving other stakeholders in the bank-those
possessing a greater interest in prudence than do the shareholders-some portion
of the right to elect directors.
B. Dividing the Tools Between Banking and CorporateLaw
Having taken an inventory of basic approaches to curb excessive risk-taking,
we now must ask which approaches lie entirely within the domain of banking
law, and in which approaches might corporate law play a role. An initial
problem with this task is that banking law and corporate law are loose concepts
rather than precisely defined terms. After admitting the term is amorphous, one
treatise describes banking law as covering the corporate operation and
establishment of banks as well as the regulation of the financial and related
services provided by a bank. A basic working definition of corporate law would
be the law governing the internal affairs of corporations. This includes the
powers and duties of directors and officers and the rights and liabilities of
shareholders.
Just from these definitions one sees an immediate overlap
between banking and corporate law when it comes to financial firms:
Specifically, since banks are organized as corporations, is the law governing the
internal affairs of banks banking law or corporate law?7 1
Rather than answer this question in the abstract, we can take a more
pragmatic approach. As stated in the introduction, this Article fits within the
broader inquiry of who should impose the rules necessary to prevent another
financial crisis. More precisely, the question is whether state legislatures and
state courts, when creating and enforcing laws for all business corporations
(rather than just for banks), are up to the task of employing such laws in a way to
prevent another financial crisis. Using this as a guidepost, banking law then
becomes laws enacted as part of legislation-be it state or, increasingly,
federal-as well as the actions of regulatory agencies, which focus on banks or
financial companies rather than business corporations more generally.

76. POLLARD & DALY, supra note 40, at § 1.01.
77. See, e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987) (defining the scope of the
internal affairs doctrine, under which the state of incorporation provides the governing corporate law rules, as
covering the relationships inter se of the corporation, its directors, officers and shareholders).
78. Indeed, a treatise in the area has the title "The Corporate Law of Banks. . . ." MICHAEL P. MALLOY,
THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS: REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF DEPOSITORY
INSTrrUTIONS (1988).
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We also can use the Citigroup example to help sort things out. Citigroup is a
bank holding company; it has subsidiaries organized under banking laws rather
than incorporated under general state corporate laws. 9 Citigroup, itself, is
incorporated under the General Business Corporation Law of Delaware.so As
such, Citigroup illustrates the interplay of banking law and corporate law with
respect to the various tools to curb excessive risk-taking by financial firms.
The two easy tools to categorize are regulation of business activities and
capital requirements. Both clearly fall within banking law as they come from
legislation directed at banks and are enforced by regulatory agencies concerned
with banks, rather than corporations generally. Indeed, regulation of a firm's
business activities is not the sort of thing one considers to be internal affairs,
even if one were dealing with general corporations rather than firms incorporated
under banking laws."
Admittedly, general corporate laws address capital
requirements; but, especially in the United States," capital rules found in general
corporate laws have become little more than a minimal prohibition on those
distributions to shareholders that would leave insufficient assets to cover debts
and liquidation preferences.83 Looking at Citigroup, agencies concerned with
banking regulate the banking activities Citigroup conducts through its banking
subsidiaries-the Federal Reserve having approved Citigroup's acquisition of
these subsidiaries.4 The mix of agencies regulating the subsidiaries depends
upon whether they are national or state banks," ignoring any overseas banking
subsidiaries. The fact that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
insures deposits in the banking subsidiaries, however, means there will be
extensive federal regulation over both the subsidiaries and Citigroup in any
86
event. Citigroup's banking subsidiaries and Citigroup are also subject to capital
requirements imposed by federal banking regulators.

79. CITIGROUP'S 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10K 2 (2009).
80. Id.
81.

See McDermott, 531 A.2d at 215.

82. Many other nations, especially those following civil law traditions, provide some minimum capital,
and sometimes even capital maintenance, requirements in their general company laws. Eg., FRANKLIN A.
GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 35-38 (2006).
83 E.g., Model Business Corporation Act §§ 6.21 (no capital requirements in issuing shares), 6.40 (2003)
(prohibiting distributions that leave assets less than debts and liquidation preferences of senior shares, or the
corporation unable to pay it bills as due). Traditional statutes, as in Delaware, complicate things with references
to par value of stock as a minimum price for shares upon issuance by the corporation and a constraint on
dividends; but par is simply a number in the certificate of incorporation subject to reduction or elimination by
amendment of the certificate. Delaware General Corporation Law §§ 102(a)(4), 153, 154, 170, 242(a)(3).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1), (2) (2006).
85. E.g., Felsenfeld, supra note 25, at 5-9.
86. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831 p-1 (2006) (authorizing federal regulatory agencies to promulgate regulations
for safety and soundness of FDIC insured depository institutions). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (2008)
(authorizing Federal Reserve Board to issue cease-and-desist orders against bank holding companies engaged in
unsafe or unsound practices on the same basis as applied to state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System and have federally insured deposits).
87. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2008).
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Things become more complicated concerning the regulation of
compensation, the imposition of liability for taking excessive risks, and the
supervision of management selection. As a Delaware corporation, Citigroup is
subject to the corporate law of that state when it comes to rules governing
compensation of Citigroup directors and officers; imposing liability on Citigroup
directors and officers for damages incurred due to unreasonable risk-taking; and
regulating the election and appointment of Citigroup directors and officers-as
these are each, normally, a matter of internal affairs and state general corporate
law.8' This explains why Citigroup shareholders brought a derivative lawsuit
against directors and officers of Citigroup in the Delaware Chancery Court to
recover losses the company sustained from its dealings in CDOs, as well as the
compensation it paid its ex-CEO,' 9 and why the court resolved this suit through
the application of Delaware corporate law. Given the widespread use of bank
holding companies," this shows the potential significance of state general
corporate law with respect to the tools for curbing excessive risk-taking by
financial firms.
On the other hand, what about Citigroup's banking subsidiaries? Because
these companies are organized under banking statutes, the issues of
compensation, liability for excessive risks, and management selection would all
seem to be banking law, even if they are the internal affairs of the banking
subsidiaries. Yet, this does not mean that state general corporate law would
necessarily be inapplicable. This is because provisions in the banking statute,
judicial decisions, or actions by the banking regulatory agency might call for the
application of the state's general corporate law on the issue."
This is best seen regarding liability for excessive risks. For decades, state
and federal courts have held that bank directors are subject to common law
fiduciary duties-including a duty of care to avoid damage to the company-the
parameters of which courts often find in general corporate law.92 For state banks,

88. E.g., Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 118 (liability for excessive risk and claims based upon excessive
compensation resolved by Delaware law for Delaware corporation); McDermott, 531 A.2d 206 (issue of who
can vote to elect directors resolved by law of state of incorporation).
89. Delaware courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving the internal affairs of
Delaware corporations, and, indeed, a securities fraud action pending in New York also asserted claims for
breach of fiduciary duty against Citigroup directors and officers based upon the CDO losses. Nevertheless, the
Delaware Chancery Court in Citigroup refused to stay the Delaware action, in part because Delaware law would
control. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 115-119.
90. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33, at 259-260 (the biggest banks in the United States are not
stand alone banks, but subsidiaries of bank holding companies and major strategic decisions are taken at the
holding company level).
91. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.2014 (1996) (replaced former 12 C.F.R. § 7.5217(a)) (Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency regulation allowing national banks to include indemnification provisions in their articles if the
provisions substantially reflect general standards of law as evidenced by the law of the state in which the bank
is headquartered, the law of the state in which the bank's holding company is incorporated, or else the relevant
provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act).
92. E.g., MALLOY, supra note 44, at §3.2.6.1.
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courts presumably look to the common law of the bank's state,93 while pre-Erie,9
federal courts applied a federal common law to national banks." In 1997,
however, the United States Supreme Court held that, even as to national banks,
state corporate law (presumably of the state in which the national bank has its
headquarters) dictates the contents of this duty.9
With the background of the savings and loan crisis, and dissatisfied with the
developments in state law that made it more difficult to bring claims for breach
of the duty of care," Congress intervened. In the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), Congress added Section 1821(k)
to Title 12 of the United States Code. Section 182 1(k) allows the FDIC to pursue
claims against directors and officers of insured banks in receivership (or that
accept FDIC assistance to avoid receivership). This section establishes the
federal standard to impose liability as gross negligence or worse; albeit, it leaves
open the possibility of recovery under state law standards that would impose
liability for conduct not as culpable as gross negligence," such as ordinary
negligence.
An obvious gap in Section 1821(k) is that it only kicks in upon the bank's
failure (or the use of FDIC funds to avoid failure). To deter misconduct short of
bank failure, the FIRREA also added a three-tier set of monetary penalties for,
among others, officers and directors of banks with deposits insured by the
FDIC, 99 as well as officers and directors of their holding companies. '" The
application of these penalties to unreasonable risks, however, is not entirely clear.
The section penalizes engaging in unsafe or unsound practices, which would
seem to include execution of unreasonable risks.'o'
However, this only
encompasses reckless or knowing acts.102 While the section also reaches breach
of fiduciary duties, it is unclear if this encompasses negligence or gross
negligence, or whether it requires some greater degree of culpability.'o

93. E.g., Joy, 692 F.2d 880 (applying Connecticut corporate law to fiduciary duties in Connecticut
commercial bank); Jones v. H.S. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (applying California corporate
law to fiduciary duties in California savings and loan).
94. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
95. E.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
96. Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
97. Id at 228 (Congress enacted Section 1821(k) against a background of failing savings and loan
associations, large federal payments to insured depositors, and recent changes to state law designed to limit
preexisting director and officer liability).
98. Id at 227.
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (2008).
100. Id. at (b)(3)(treating a holding company like a state FDIC insured bank for purposes of section
1818(i)).
101. E.g., Heidi Schooner, FiduciaryDuties' Demanding Cousin: Bank DirectorLiabilityfor Unsafe or
Unsound Banking Practices,63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 175, 188-202 (1995).

102.

12 U.S.C.

§ 1818(i)(2)(B)(i),

(C) (2008).

103. E.g., II KENNETH M. LAPINE, DENNIS LASSILA, BURTON V. MCCULLOUGH, PAUL S. PILECKI &
HAROLD WEISBLATT, BANKING LAW § 45.08[2] (Supp. 2008).
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All told, legal liability upon bank directors and officers for excessive risk
involves a blending of rules specifically directed at banks, together with general
corporate law applied by analogy. With executive compensation, too, use of
general corporate law fiduciary duty rules applied by analogy'" mix with explicit
banking law rules. Indeed, in the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Congress
specifically identified compensation as one of the areas for banking agencies to
address in regulations creating standards for safety and soundness of insured
banks and their holding companies.' 5 In October 2009, responding to concerns
about the incentives for excessive risk-taking resulting from some forms of
compensation, the Federal Reserve proposed incentive compensation policies for
all banking organizations subject to its supervision, including member banks and
bank holding companies.'06 The policies are designed to prevent incentive
compensation from encouraging excessive risk-taking.
Finally, a blended system also exists with respect to management selection.
Banking statutes codify general corporate law principles under which the
shareholders elect the directors and the directors appoint the officers for banks. 07
Moving beyond common norms of general corporate law, banking statutes grant
regulatory agencies the power to remove directors, officers, and other affiliated
parties of insured banks-and even of bank holding companies'os-for various
misdeeds, and to prevent their further employment by any financial institution.'9
The impact of the removal power on excessive risk-taking is somewhat muted,
however. Among conduct that can produce removal is participation in unsafe or
unsound banking practices, or breach of fiduciary duty."o Yet, the conduct must
demonstrate willful or continuing disregard for the institution's safety (or else
personal dishonesty) in order to warrant removal."'
Banking law can also curb the effectiveness of the shareholder voting
franchise. Specifically, as stated above, acquisition by one corporation of
sufficient shares in a banking corporation to make the acquiring corporation a
bank holding company requires approval by the Federal Reserve. Acquisition of
a controlling amount of shares in an FDIC insured bank or a bank holding
company by any person-whether or not the acquirer is a corporation-is subject

104. E.g., V. Gerard Comizio & Sheila Dombal Swarz, Show Me the Money: Federal Banking
Regulation of Executive Compensation and Benefit Matters, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 271, 319 (2000).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 183 lp-l(c) (2006).
106. E.g., James Morphy, Fed Proposes Incentive Compensation Policies for Banking Organizations,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION, Nov. 3, 2009, http://blogs.law.
harvard.edulcorpgov/2009/l1/03/fed-proposes-incentive-compensation-policies-for-bankingorganizations/#more-5029.
107. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 71 (2008).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (2008) (treating a holding company like a state insured bank for purposes
of Section 1818(e)).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2008).
110. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii).
111. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).
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to disapproval by banking authorities under the Change in Bank Control Act.'2
The significance of this veto over bank acquisitions should not be underestimated
since the significance of the shareholder voting franchise in a widely held
corporation often lies primarily in the prospect of a hostile tender offer."' Still,
the impact of these provisions on the pressure to increase reported earnings
because of the market for corporate control is attenuated by the fact that the
acquisition of a bank with lower earnings by an institution with higher earnings,
in and of itself, would not seem to be grounds for disapproval."14
IV. WHY IT MATTERS: CITIGROUPAS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE
LIMITATIONS OF STATE CORPORATE LAW

In many instances, disputes over whether a particular tool of regulation
belongs to one field of law or another seem to involve little more than tacky turf
wars-whether that is between agencies and their legislative oversight
committees or between professors carving up the law school curriculum. When
asking whether the tools for limiting risk involve banking law or corporate law,
however, something more important is at stake. This is because the two laws
involve fundamentally different structural and philosophical underpinnings,
which impact their effectiveness in employing the tools they possess to limit
excessive risk-taking.
At its core, banking regulation is largely national and mandatory. Of course,
this is an oversimplification. For example, the United States has a dual banking
system with national banks chartered and regulated by the federal government
through the Comptroller of the Currency, and state banks chartered and regulated
by state banking agencies."' This has allowed a certain degree of regulatory
arbitrage as banks jump between federal and state charters to gain some
advantage under the system.' 16 Moreover, the narrative of the last couple of
decades in banking law has been one of deregulation, as banks have been allowed
to engage in practices (such as the securities business) previously barred to
them."' Yet, it is important not to let the details obscure the central core.
Despite the existence of state chartered banks, banking law has essentially
become national. This is because virtually all state chartered banks have opted
for FDIC insurance, and in doing so, they become subject to extensive federal

112. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (2009).
113. E.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965).
114. E.g., JULIE L. WILLIAMS, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CONVERSION,
§4.02(5)(a)(i) (Scott Zesch, ed., 2009).
115. E.g., Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220-21.
116. E.g., FELSENFELD, supra note 25, at 28-29.
117. E.g. id. at 88-110 (decline in regulation of interest rates on deposit accounts), 145-202
(liberalization of activities for bank holding companies), 225-234 (allowing inter-state banking), 245-302
(allowing holding companies to engage in securities business).
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regulation."' Also, despite liberalization, banking law is essentially mandatory.
By and large, banking regulations are not default rules which the owners of the
business can contract around." 9 This is because, as discussed earlier, the essence
of banking is the effort by the business' owners (shareholders), or managers
working on the owners' behalf, to make money by risking the money of other
persons-depositors, or the taxpayers in the case of deposit insurance-who are
not in a position to contractually limit risk-taking by owners or managers. Under
these circumstances, even before the most recent misadventure in finance, policy
makers recognized the inherent temptation (or moral hazard) to engage in
unreasonably dangerous risk-taking, as well as the externalities produced when
the owners or managers succumb to this temptation. Accordingly, the law
imposes mandatory limits on risky activities by a bank.
By contrast, at its core, corporate law is state law and permissive. This
difference in the source and underlying philosophy of corporate law limits its
ability to utilize the tools available to it as an effective control on excessive risktaking by financial institutions. To illustrate the point, we look to the Citigroup
decision.
A. CitigroupAs a Case Study In Weak CorporateLaw
1. Overview
In Citigroup, shareholders of the company brought a derivative action against
current and former directors and officers of Citigroup, alleging that the directors
and officers breached their fiduciary duties by failing to properly monitor and
manage the risks Citigroup faced in its dealings in CDOs and the subprime
mortgage lending market. Specifically, the plaintiff shareholders alleged that the
directors and officers ignored extensive "red flags" of the problems that were
brewing in the real estate and credit markets. The shareholders also complained
about the board's failure to disclose to the shareholders the risks faced by the
company and about certain board decisions; specifically those that increased
Citigroup's exposure to risks from subprime loans, that repurchased Citigroup
stock at high prices, and that gave generous compensation to the outgoing CEO
upon his removal because of Citigroup's massive losses.
As mentioned earlier, imposing liability for taking unreasonable risk involves
both substantive and procedural standards and rules. Citigroup serves as a good
illustration. A derivative suit is a procedural mechanism for enforcing fiduciary
118. E.g., Michael P. Malloy, Seeing the Light: Savings Association Conversions and Federal
Regulatory Realignment, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 189, 223-24 (1991) (arguing that prevalence of FDIC
insured institutions combined with federal regulation of such institutions has substantially federalized bank
regulation).
119. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 18 3 1p-I (authorizing federal regulatory agencies to promulgate regulations
for safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, with no indication that such regulations are optional
for the bank's owners).
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duties owed to the corporation by allowing a shareholder of the company to bring
a suit seeking recovery for the company rather than for the shareholder. 20
Because such a suit removes the board's normal control over corporate
decisions-in this instance, whether to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the
company-derivative suits face a special pleading requirement designed to
establish that the board is not the appropriate body to decide whether to bring the
lawsuit in question.121 Specifically, the plaintiff must plead with particularity
either that the plaintiff has made a demand for action upon the board and a reason
why the court should ignore the board's rejection of the plaintiffs demand, or a
good excuse for not making such a demand. 2 In most jurisdictions, including
Delaware, a good excuse for not making a demand is that demand would be futile
because we know, even before the demand is made, that the court will ignore the
directors' rejection of demand.' The plaintiff establishes this by pleading with
particularity that most of the board members breached their duty and should be
sued by the corporation, or that most of the board members are under the control
of a party who should be sued by the corporation; meaning, in either event, that
most of the board members are not the parties who should decide whether the

company should sue.12

4

The Citigroup opinion arose from a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to make such a demand or plead an adequate excuse. In response, the
Delaware Chancery (trial) Court had to assess whether the plaintiffs had
successfully pled, with particularity, an excuse-in this case, the plaintiffs'
excuse being that most of Citigroup's current directors had breached their
fiduciary duty. With one exception, the court in Citigroup concluded that the
plaintiffs had not succeeded in this task. In particular, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' allegations that the directors had breached their duty by ignoring red
flags warning of trouble; as well as allegations that the directors breached their
duty regarding either disclosure or decisions the directors made that exposed
Citigroup to risks in the subprime market and that had the company repurchasing
its stock when the price was high. The only claim which survived the court's
scrutiny was the allegation that the compensation awarded to the fired CEO
constituted waste.
Of course, the Chancery Court's dismissal of the excessive risk-taking
claims, in itself, does not establish that either Delaware corporate law liability
rules or their application are necessarily weaker than one might expect from rules
or application under a different regime. Instead, we must examine more carefully
the basis for the Delaware court's decision and compare the critical steps with the
closest analogy arising under banking or other regulatory statutes. In this

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

E.g. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.3 (2000).
E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Del. Ct. R. 23.1.
E.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
E.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004).
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discussion, it is important to keep in mind that the goal is not to criticize the
Citigroup decision from a doctrinal, or even, at this point, from a policy
standpoint. Rather, the point is simply comparative: Citigroup illustrates that
corporate law is weaker (in the sense of being less likely to produce liability)
than banking law or other regulatory regimes are likely to be. In turn, as
discussed earlier, there is less deterrence of excessive risk-taking.
2. The Standard
We begin with the standard for imposing liability applied by the court. The
court's opinion in Citigroup is littered with references to the business judgment
rule; so much so that a casual reading might lead one to assume that this rule
provided the standard against which the court assessed liability. The business
judgment rule means different things to different courts, all of which center on
the notion that courts should be reticent to impose liability based upon, or
otherwise second guess, decisions by corporate directors.' In Delaware, the rule
requires the plaintiff to establish that disinterested directors are guilty of gross,
rather than just ordinary, negligence in order to prove a breach of the directors'
duty of care in making a decision. 26 The business judgment rule, however, did
not provide the relevant standard in Citigroup. For one thing, the plaintiffs' chief
complaint was not about a decision by Citigroup's board of directors. Rather,
they largely complained about the failure of the Citigroup board to act, despite
warning signs of excessive risk. Such a seemingly unconsidered failure to act
does not invoke the protection of the business judgment rule, as this rule protects
the board from claims it made poor decisions, rather than from claims it was not
paying sufficient attention.127
While the Citigroup plaintiffs' focus on claims involving inattention should
have lowered the culpability standard the plaintiffs faced, a more important fact
in the case significantly raised the standard the plaintiffs needed to overcome.
Citigroup, as is typical of Delaware corporations, has a provision in its certificate
of incorporation permitted by Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law. Section 102(b)(7) allows a certificate of incorporation to
contain a provision waiving damage claims against directors for breach of
fiduciary duty unless the breach involves certain categories of conduct; for
example, the section prohibits waiver of damages for acts not in good faith.
Hence, to prevail, the plaintiffs in Citigroup had to establish that the directors
failed to act in good faith.
Analytically, the question of how to apply the test of good faith to a case
claiming director inattention is not straightforward. After all, traditionally one
125.
126.
127.
30, 2003).
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thinks of good faith as meaning that the directors subjectively thought their
action was in the best interest of the corporation.12 This works for a board
decision-which is why courts commonly mention good faith in the context of
the business judgment rulel 2 9 -but seems less relevant in the context of an
inattention case where, presumably, directors did not notice the danger to the
corporation and the question is whether there was a reason for them to have done
so. Nevertheless, beginning with dicta in the landmark Caremark opinionO and
culminating in a holding by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter,3 1
Delaware courts have applied good faith to inattention claims. Specifically,
Delaware courts have explained that if the plaintiff showed not only that the
directors breached their duty of care due to inattention, but also showed the
directors knew they were breaching their duty, then the directors would not be
acting in good faith. 132 The problem, however, is to prove the directors actually
knew they were breaching their duty when they failed to act. Instead of
demanding direct proof of subjective knowledge, Delaware courts appear to
allow a sort of indirect proof by a showing of a sufficiently egregious case of
inattention. Specifically, a sustained or systematic failure to exercise oversight,
such as utterly failing to implement any reporting system or consciously failing
to monitor the operation of such a system, will establish a lack of good faith.' It
was this standard of good faith that the court applied in Citigroup.
How does this good faith standard compare to a standard for imposing
liability that we might expect to find in a national banking law? We need not
guess, because we know. Recall the earlier discussion of 12 U.S.C. Section
1821(k), enacted as part of the FIRREA. As explained earlier, this section allows
the FDIC to pursue claims against directors and officers of insured banks in
receivership. Section 1821(k) establishes gross negligence as the standard for
finding liability. Is this the same as a lack of good faith, as Delaware courts have
interpreted the terms? The answer, as the Delaware Supreme Court pointed out
in its Disney decision,134 is no. After all, equating gross negligence with a lack of
good faith would render Section 102(b)(7) illusory in the context it was meant to
address, since, as stated above, without gross negligence there is no liability to
waive under Delaware's version of the business judgment rule. Indeed, it was a
decision finding liability based upon gross negligence in making a business
decision' which provoked the enactment of Section 102(b)(7).'36 Hence, by
128. E.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d 805 at 812.
129. E.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 n. 66.
130. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
131. 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64-66 (Del. 2006).
135. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
136. E.g., James J. Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988).
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allowing directors to escape liability unless plaintiffs can demonstrate the
directors' lack of good faith, the Section 102(b)(7) waiver raises the barrier for
imposing liability from the gross negligence standard called for in the case of an
FDIC action on behalf of a failed bank under Section 1821(k).'17
3. Application
Ultimately, the significance of a standard for imposing liability comes in its
application. Looking at the application of the standard in Citigroup,it is helpful
to note that there are two types of inattention cases. There are the cases in which
senior officers or directors ignore warning signs of employee misdeeds or other
problems within the corporation.' Such warning signs are often, as in Citibank,
referred to as "red flags." Other cases, by contrast, involve claims that the
directors failed to implement adequate systems to discover misdeeds or other
problems without waiting for warning signs of particular trouble." To use a
metaphor, the first sort of cases involves situations in which the directors smelled
smoke, but did not investigate to see if there was a fire; while the second sort of
cases involves situations in which the claim is that the directors failed either to
install or maintain smoke detectors.
The Citigroup complaint seems to have given limited attention to possible
claims based upon the inadequacy of Citibank's monitoring systems (smoke
detectors), in this case to monitor for excessive risk. Indeed, while the complaint
quotes some newspaper stories that speak of poor risk management, and the
plaintiffs' reply brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss introduces the more
detailed news reports concerning the flaws in Citigroup's risk management, the
Chancery Court treats the complaint as virtually conceding the monitoring
systems issue by making reference to the Audit and Risk Management
Committee of Citigroup's board, which was charged with oversight of the firm's
risk management system and met eleven or twelve times a year in the years most
relevant. The plaintiffs' failure to make more out of the structural problems in
Citigroup's risk management systems that were discussed earlier seems
perplexing. Of immediate relevance to the comparison between banking law and

137. Admittedly, as discussed earlier, Section 1818(i) imposes a more demanding standard of
culpability (reckless or knowing) before imposing financial penalties on officers or directors who engage in
unsafe or unsound banking practices in a bank that does not fail. This, however, seems to reflect the difference
between what Congress viewed as a tort-like recovery provision (Section 1821(k)) and what Congress viewed
as a criminal like penal provision (Section 1818(i)). Specifically, 1821(k) provides recovery for losses suffered
by the bank (and, therefore, the FDIC), whereas 1818(i) provides a flat fine for each day of continuing violation.
Most significantly, however, it was 1821(k), not 1818(i), that Congress enacted because of its dissatisfaction
with state law developments, along the lines of Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
which made it more difficult to recover against grossly negligent bank corporation directors. See supra text
accompanying note 97.
138. E.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920) (bank president ignored a number of warnings of
bookkeeper's dishonesty).
139. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
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state corporate law standards, neither the plaintiffs nor the court seem concerned
that federal regulatory officials had condemned Citigroup's risk management
practices. Perhaps this simply reflects the competence of the plaintiffs'
attorneys. Yet, it probably did not matter. Given the Delaware Supreme Court's
2006 Stone v. Ritter decision, so long as there is some system in place,
complaints about the inadequacies of the system would not meet Delaware
corporate law standards for imposing liability, even when inadequacy in the
system is documented by federal regulatory findings.
In fact, Stone provides a telling example of the disparity between banking
standards and the standards for imposing liability under Delaware corporate law.
In Stone, the plaintiff shareholders alleged that the directors of a bank breached
their duty by failing to ensure that the bank's employees complied with federal
law requiring the filing of suspicious activity reports. The employees' noncompliance allowed the bank to be used in a Ponzi scheme and resulted in federal
banking authorities imposing $50 million in fines and penalties on the bank.
Notably, in assessing these fines, federal banking officials found that the Bank
Secrecy Act compliance program at the bank lacked adequate board and
management oversight. However, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone
affirmed the dismissal of the shareholders' complaint against the directors. How
could the court do so in the face of federal regulatory findings of inadequate
oversight by the bank's board? The answer is that the bank's certificate of
incorporation contained a waiver of liability under Section 102(b)(7), meaning
the directors could only be liable to the bank for their inattention if they failed to
act in good faith. Since the plaintiffs' allegations in Stone admitted that the
board had instituted an extensive reporting system on employee regulatory
compliance-even if one that the federal banking authorities ultimately found to
be seriously inadequate-the plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to establish
the sort of sustained or systematic failure to monitor necessary to establish a lack
of good faith.
Having eschewed much of a claim based upon inadequate monitoring
systems, the Citigroup plaintiffs alleged that the directors ignored red flags of
dangerous risk stemming from Citigroup's huge positions in subprime mortgages
and subprime mortgage-based securities (CDOs). These red flags ranged from a
2005 article in the New York Times by economist (later to win the Nobel Prize)
Paul Krugman, which warned that America's housing market was approaching
"the final, feverish stages of a speculative bubble;" to various public events in
2006 and 2007, including bankruptcies and credit rating downgrades, which
demonstrated problems both in the subprime market and in CDOs based upon
subprime mortgages. To the court, however, such public red flags established
nothing since they did not warn of wrongdoing at Citigroup.
There are a couple of different ways one could interpret the court's reaction
in this regard. In part, this could be harkening back to a discussion in the court's
opinion in which the court suggested that claims in Delaware based on
inattention (so-called Caremark claims) might be limited to the failure to detect
141
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illegal actions or other specific wrongdoing by employees in the corporation-as
in Caremark'" and Stone-rather than the failure to detect and prevent excessive,
but legal, business risks by company employees.
Invoking the policies
underlying the business judgment rule, the court expressed concern that a duty to
monitor for business risk, as opposed to misconduct, could discourage the sort of
risk-taking which is necessary in business. The court also used this distinction to
explain the success of a recent derivative lawsuit against directors of A.I.G.141
noting that in the A.I.G. case the complaint alleged that directors failed to
exercise oversight to prevent pervasive fraudulent and criminal conduct, rather
than prevent excessive business risk-taking.
One could argue about whether the Chancery Court's views in regard to
monitoring for business risk are an accurate reflection of Delaware corporate
law.142
1Moreover,
one might ask what the Chancery Court would have done in a
pair of overseas proceedings brought in the 1990s against directors of the
Diawal 43 and Barings'" banks after the directors failed to prevent unauthorized
securities trading, costing each firm over a billion dollars. Presumably, directors
should have a duty to ensure employees not only act legally but also stay within
their authority, as there is no reason to encourage risk-taking by persons acting
contrary to their instructions. Yet, if the court says the directors have a duty to
monitor because unauthorized actions are employee misconduct and not just
business risk, and at the same time the court refuses to find any duty to monitor
authorized risk-taking, the result could create the perverse incentive of tempting
directors to remove limits on the authority of lower level employees, thereby
lessening the possibility of liability from failing to monitor against unauthorized
acts-hardly the desired result. Hence, it is difficult to see how one can hold the
line the Chancery Court attempted to draw between misconduct and business
risks.
In any event, the critical point for present purposes is that there seems little
basis, if one were applying banking law, for the Chancery Court's possible
rejection of a duty to monitor for business risks. Rather, it seems evident that
bank directors are supposed to monitor for business risks and not just against

wrongdoing.145

140. In Caremark, the claim involved the board's failure to detect and prevent violations by employees
of Medicare rules limiting the payment of referral fees.
141. In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del.Ch.2009).
142. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967,
988-989 (2009) (arguing that Citigroupis inconsistent with Caremarkand Delaware law in possibly rejecting a
duty to monitor business risks as opposed to just for misconduct).
143. Nishimura v. Abekawa, 1721 Hanrei Jiho 3 (Osaka D. Ct., Sept. 20, 2000), translated in Bruce E.
Aronson, Learning from Comparative Law in Teaching U.S. Corporate Law:I. Director's Liability in Japan
and the U.S., 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 213 (2003).
144. In re Barings Plc (No. 6), [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433 (Ch. Div. Companies Court) (Eng.).
145. E.g., Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986); BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONs 4-5 (2006).

142

GlobalBusiness & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 23
Alternately, perhaps the court could not accept the idea that public
information ever constitutes a red flag. After all, by the very nature of the fact
that the "red flags" were public, we know that Citigroup's directors were hardly
alone in missing the warnings about the existence of a housing bubble and the
early signs of demise in the subprime market. Again, we must ask whether those
enforcing a banking law or another regulatory regime would see things
differently. Here, there is an informative comparison to be found in a decision
applying federal securities law.
One of the lawsuits resulting from the spectacular collapse of Worldcom, Inc.
in 2002 was a securities fraud class action brought by purchasers of bonds, which
Worldcom sold to the public in 2000 and 2001 .146Among the purchasers' causes
of action was a claim under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act against the
underwriters in these bond offerings (who included, interestingly enough, a
company absorbed by Citigroup). The 1933 Act requires filing a registration
statement with the Securities Exchange Commission before one may sell
securities to the public.147 To deter making false or misleading statements in this
document, Section 11 of the Act grants persons purchasing securities sold under
a registration statement containing a false or misleading statement a claim for
damages against a number of parties, including the underwriter. The registration
statements for Worldcom's bond offerings incorporated by reference Worldcom
financial statements, audited by the Arthur Andersen accounting firm, which
improperly treated almost $4 billion worth of payments by Worldcom as capital
expenditures rather than current expenses. The result was to report net income
during a period in which Worldcom actually lost money.
Section 11 creates a defense for underwriters with respect to portions of the
registration statement prepared on the authority of an expert (such as the financial
statements audited by Arthur Andersen) if the underwriters can establish they did
not believe, and had no reasonable grounds to believe, the statements were false.
This, in turn, raised the issue as to whether there were any "red flags" that gave
the underwriters reasonable grounds to believe the audited financial statements
might have a problem. The plaintiffs argued there was such a red flag; an
important component of Worldcom's expenses as reported in the audited
financial statements was better than its competitors. This, the plaintiffs argued,
should not have been an expected result in a highly competitive industry in which
competitors could not survive with significantly higher costs than one another;
hence, it should have led one to question Worldcom's expense numbers.
In response, the underwriters pointed out that the audited Worldcom financial
statements in question came from earlier filings Worldcom made with the
Securities Exchange Commission, meaning the public had been aware of the cost
comparison for some time. Yet, none of the investment analysts that followed

146.
147.

In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litig., 346 F.Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1935).
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Worldcom stock, nor anyone else, had noticed the implications of the cost
comparison argued by the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the court rejected the
argument that, because everyone else missed the significance of a publicly
known fact, such a fact cannot constitute a red flag the defendant should have
noticed. The moral is that the answer to the question of what is a red flag may
vary depending upon whether we are dealing with a regulatory regime imposing
rigorous gate-keeping responsibilities, such as securities law imposes upon
underwriters in a public offering, or whether we are dealing with the willingness
of those enforcing ordinary corporate law to impose liability upon directors.
Finally, putting aside the questions of whether either public warnings, or
warning of general business risk rather than misconduct can constitute red flags,
the court in Citigroupfaulted gaps in the plaintiffs' pleading on the claim that the
directors ignored the red flags. Specifically, the complaint left unanswered such
questions as what exactly the directors did upon learning of the so-called red
flags, and what exactly the plaintiffs claimed the directors should have done.
Had the rules of ordinary notice pleading applied, such gaps probably would not
have mattered.148 However, the plaintiffs faced the requirement that, in order to
excuse demand, they must plead "with particularity" their claim against most of
the current board. The problem the plaintiffs faced in pleading such detail was
that they had not had the opportunity to take discovery during which they might
investigate exactly what the directors' reactions were to the alleged red flags.
Once again, the question arises: Would the situation have been different in an
action to enforce banking law or another regulatory scheme? Because the
heightened pleading standard facing the plaintiffs in Citigroup is a product of the
derivative suit mechanism used to enforce fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation under corporate law, it would not have applied had there been an
action, for instance, by the FDIC under Section 1821(k) of the FIRREA on behalf
of a financial firm in receivership.149
4. The Waste Claim
The Citigroup opinion showed much greater sympathy toward the plaintiffs'
claim challenging the compensation awarded to Citigroup's outgoing CEO,
Charles Prince. Here, the plaintiffs' complaint incorporated a letter agreement
entered into between Citigroup and Prince upon Prince's removal, under which
Prince received $68 million-including bonus, salary, and accumulated
stockholdings. In exchange, the letter agreement contemplated that Prince would
sign a non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement agreement, a non-

148. See, e.g., Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (held that a
complaint for breach of an oral agreement was adequate under notice pleading standard despite the lack of
details regarding the contract).
149. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1992) (action brought by F.D.I.C.
without anyone arguing that demand was required).
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solicitation agreement, and a release of any claims he might have against
Citigroup.
Since the directors approving this agreement were not parties to it, the
plaintiffs could only prevail in challenging the merits of this decision if, at the
very least, they established that the agreement constituted "waste." 5 o Waste is a
transaction so unbalanced that no reasonable person would conclude the
corporation received the equivalent to what it gave up in the deal.'"' In this
instance, there were a couple of key facts unknown from the complaint that
prevented the court from determining whether the letter agreement was
sufficiently one-sided to constitute waste. To begin with, it was uncertain how
much additional compensation the letter agreement actually provided over and
above what Prince was already entitled to under his employment contract
(keeping in mind that, under the letter agreement, Prince would be relinquishing
anything still owed under his existing employment contract). Also indeterminate
was the value of the rest of the promises made by Prince in the letter agreement.
Given these open questions, the court decided that the case should go forward.
The court's analysis of the "compensation equals waste" claim seems
inconsistent with the approach of the rest of the opinion. To begin with, what
happened to the good faith standard resulting from the Section 102(b)(7)
provision in Citigroup's certificate of incorporation-i.e., why is the court now
applying a waste, rather than a good faith, standard? The answer must be that the
court is treating waste as establishing a lack of good faith. One rationale for this
result would be the assertion that directors who enter a transaction so unbalanced
that no reasonable business person would say the corporation received the
equivalent to what it gave must not have acted in the good faith belief they were
benefitting the corporation.
There may also be another reason to treat waste as establishing the failure to
act in good faith for purposes of Section 102(b)(7) waivers. A transaction
amounting to waste is one that even an affirmative vote by the majority of
shareholders cannot save over the objection of any minority shareholders.'52
While there may be greater freedom of action for provisions in the certificate of
incorporation on the ground that all shareholders have bought into the contract
represented by the corporate charter, a court may nevertheless be tempted to
interpret the limits on the claims shareholders can waive ex ante-through a
provision allowed by Section 102(b)(7)-to parallel the limits on the transactions
a majority of the shareholders can save ex post by a vote of approval.
The greater inconsistency in the court's opinion comes in its attitude toward
unanswered questions left after reading the plaintiffs' complaint. Addressing the

150. E.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 (applying waste standard to compensation approved by disinterested
directors); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39 (Del. Ch. 1960) (compensation approved by disinterested
directors entitled to deference under the business judgment rule).
151. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979).
152. Id. at219.
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compensation claim, the court resolved the two critical uncertainties in what
Citigroup received under the letter agreement in the plaintiffs' favor, by making
those the grounds for denying the motion to dismiss the complaint. In contrast,
as discussed above regarding the red flags claim, when dealing with other claims
in the complaint, the court pointed to critical gaps in its knowledge left by the
plaintiffs' complaint as reasons why the complaint failed to meet the pleading
standard for excusing demand.
In fact, the Citigroup court's liberality in dealing with the plaintiffs'
pleadings when it came to the compensation claim appears to be inconsistent
with other Delaware cases dealing with claims of waste in decisions to pay
compensation. For example, in the leading Aronson decision,' the Delaware
Supreme Court followed a more typical approach in dismissing a complaint
because it contained insufficient details in alleging waste.
Aronson was a derivative action in which the plaintiff alleged that the
directors had breached their duty by approving an employment contract between
the corporation and one member of the board, Leo Fink, who also happened to
own forty-seven percent of the corporation's outstanding stock. Fink, who was
seventy-five years old, had retired under a pre-existing employment contract and
was receiving consulting fees. The new contract reinstated Fink's employment,
but provided that Fink could retire again at any time, after which he would again
become a consultant to the corporation. Critically, the new contract also
provided that Fink was entitled to receive compensation even if he was unable to
perform services for the corporation, which the plaintiff alleged amounted to
waste. Pointing to a lack of any allegations that Fink was in poor health-or
presumably otherwise planned to take advantage of the provision allowing
compensation without work-the court held the allegation insufficient to
establish that the board had breached its duty in approving the contract, thereby
excusing demand.
Still, one should not assume that the Citigroup opinion marks a significant
stiffening of the Delaware courts' collective spine when it comes to
compensation challenges. In fact, we have been down this road in Delaware
before with complaints challenging compensation packages whose magnitude
and circumstances have caught media attention. Most notably, in the Disney
litigation, the Delaware courts faced a challenge to a compensation package
under which Michael Ovitz received roughly $140 million upon his termination
after an unsuccessful year as the number two senior executive at Disney. This
inspired considerable media attention and shareholder litigation.
Initially in the Disney litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint, viewing the situation as an unremarkable exercise of
business judgment. On appeal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court, cognizant

153. Aronson, 473 A.2d 805.
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of the case's notoriety, showed more concern.'"4 It expressed the view that the
sloppy processes allegedly followed by Disney's board, and the sheer size of the
payout to Ovitz, rendered this "a close case." In the end, the Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint due to its "deficient pleading,"
but, in an important post-script, instructed the Chancery Court to grant the
plaintiffs leave to amend.
After following the Supreme Court's advice to seek more facts through the
exercise of shareholder inspection rights, the Disney plaintiffs returned with an
amended complaint. The new complaint turned out to be enough for the
Chancery Court'"-whose attitude toward the case seemed to have undergone a
shift (as evident in the Court's critical asides about the possible impact of the
friendship between Disney's CEO, Michael Eisner, and Ovitz on the favorable
treatment that Ovitz received). Still, the net upshot of the Chancery Court's new
decision was simply to postpone the day of reckoning for the Disney plaintiffs.
After several years and a long trial, the Chancery Court, while remaining critical
of the Disney directors-particularly Eisner-nevertheless gave judgment for the
defendants, concluding that the directors' conduct was not so bad as to fall
outside the protections of the business judgment rule. On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed.16 Whether a similar fate awaits the claim regarding
Prince's compensation in Citigroup remains to be seen.
In fact, judging from the track record of Delaware cases dealing with waste,
the odds are extraordinarily slim that the Citigroup plaintiffs will ultimately
succeed at trial in their claim based on Prince's compensation. As put by a
highly regarded Delaware Chancery Court judge, Delaware cases in which
courts, after a trial, actually concluded there was waste might be as difficult to
find as the Loch Ness Monster.' Hence, this part of the Citigroup opinion may
be bluff and bluster.
In any event, neither the waste standard itself nor the application of this
standard when dealing with Prince's termination package suggests much focus on
the possible affect of compensation in encouraging excessive risk-taking. The
inquiry is a crude one of whether the corporation received so little in exchange
for the compensation that no reasonable business person would say the
corporation got anything equal to what it paid. Consistent with this, the two
unanswered questions about the letter agreement in Citigroup simply went to
measuring the value of what Citigroup received for the $68 million. The court
does not engage in the more subtle inquiry of whether Prince's compensation
package, by cushioning the impact of his dismissal, may encourage excessive
risk-taking by other Citigroup executives in the future. Indeed, in the Disney
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155.
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Brehm, 746 A.2d at 265-67.
In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27.
Steiner v. Meyerson, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jul. 19, 1995).
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litigation, arguments that the Ovitz contract constituted waste because of its
incentive impact received little sympathy.'
B. The Structural Underpinningsof Weak CorporateLaw
Citigroup illustrates that results under Delaware corporate law are weaker in
imposing liability upon directors and officers who take unreasonable risks than
what we might expect from banking or other regulatory law. This leads one to
ask what produces this outcome. Specifically, is there something structural
acting upon the legislatures and courts which create and enforce corporate law
that leads it to be inherently weaker than banking or other regulatory law?
1. Who Picked the Delaware Legislature and Courts to Make the Rules for
Citigroup?
As previously stated, whereas banking law has become essentially federal,
corporate law in the United States is, for the most part, 59 state law. Yet, this
sentence understates the difference in a key way: It ignores the degree to which
the state law regime in corporate law consists of a supermarket where those
operating corporations can shop for the law they desire.
Corporate law in the United States follows what is known as the
incorporation doctrine, under which persons can form corporations in states (such
as the state of Delaware) other than one in which the company will conduct
operations.
What makes this significant is another doctrine generally followed

158. The plaintiffs noted that, under the contract, Ovitz would actually do better financially by being
terminated, so long as it was not for cause, than he would by staying on the job. The court responded that Ovitz
hardly appeared to be trying to get himself dismissed but without giving cause within the meaning of the
contract. The more subtle incentive problem-that such a contract gave Ovitz little incentive to provide
optimum performance-is not an argument the court even recognized. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27.
159. Federal statutes have effectively nationalized various aspects of corporate law for public
companies. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes requirements with respect to the audit committees of
public companies. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act). Despite
these inroads, however, corporate law is predominately state law, particularly in the areas-liability for
excessive risk-taking, limits on compensation, and selection of directors and officers-relevant to curbing
excessive risk. E.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The primary exceptions of relevance
relate to the selection of directors. Here, there is federal regulation of proxy solicitations for public corporations
under Section 14(a), and federal regulation of tender offers under Section 14(d) and (e), of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. Indeed, pursuant to its authority to regulate the solicitation of proxies, the Securities Exchange
Commission recently responded to the financial crisis by proposing to require companies provide greater
disclosures about their risk oversight practices, including information as to the board's role in risk management
and the qualifications and experiences of directors and director nominees. E.g., Lipton, supra note 30. Whether
such disclosure will actually change who gets elected to the board or the risk practices of the board, however, is
another matter-and beyond the power of the Securities Exchange Commission under Section 14(a).
160. See, e.g., Model Business Corporations Act § 3.02(10) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101(a),
102(a)(2) (1998). By contrast, many continental European nations traditionally operated under the view that
corporations must be formed in the nation in which the company had its headquarters-variously called the
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in the United States, known as the internal affairs rule. Under the internal affairs
rule, courts, for the most part, apply the law of the state of incorporation when it
comes to issues of corporate law."' The combination of the incorporation
doctrine and the internal affairs rule means that parties forming a corporation can
select which state's corporate law they wish to govern their corporation largely
unencumbered by concerns about where the company actually intends to conduct
business.
The result of parties' ability to choose their state of incorporation for its law
has resulted in what Justice Brandeis famously labeled, a "race . . . not of

diligence but of laxity." 62 Specifically, he noted how a number of smaller states
had enacted less restrictive corporate laws in order to gain revenues from
incorporation fees and franchise taxes.
New Jersey was a pioneer in this
endeavor, but after it retrenched under the reform leadership of then-governor
Woodrow Wilson, Delaware became the leading state in attracting incorporation
through so-called liberal corporation laws. 6 1
Of course, persons might choose to set up their banks in jurisdictions with
less regulation. Indeed, this has become a concern with national, as opposed to
international, bank regulation, in an era of increasing global finance.'
Moreover, to the extent that moving bank operations to avoid regulation has a
significant impact on jobs and the like, jurisdictions may be more susceptible to
engage in a race to the bottom than in corporate law, where the impact is largely
limited to franchise fees and the like. This said, however, there presumably are
much greater constraints on a firm's willingness to attempt regulatory arbitrage
when it must move actual banking operations to a potentially less desirable
business location.
The focus of Justice Brandeis' famous quote was on the demise of corporate
size and activity limits, a subject which is now the concern of antitrust rather than
corporate law. In more recent decades, the concern about Delaware and the race
to the bottom has focused instead on the notion that the Delaware legislature and
courts have sought to appeal to those who plan to be directors or controlling
shareholders-who normally choose where to incorporate-by watering down

siege social, siege real, or seat theory. Under this view, a nation would reject the effort to incorporate under its
law if the corporate headquarters would be in another nation, and a nation in which a firm had its headquarters
would refuse to recognize the firm as a corporation-meaning, for example, the firm would lack the capacity to
sue in this nation's courts and its owners might face personal liability-unless the firm incorporated under this
nation's, rather than another nation's, laws. E.g., Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to Uberseering: Free
Movement of Companies, Private InternationalLaw, and Company Law, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 177, 180-85
(2003).
161. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 302 (2009); Model Business
Corporations Act § 15.05, official cmt. (2003).
162. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-65 (1933) (Brandeis, dissenting).
163. E.g., Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 249, 270-71 (1976).
164. E.g., Posner supra note 37.
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regulation on such persons.'6 1 One example relevant to this Article is to reduce
the prospects that directors will be held liable for breaching their duty of care to
the corporation.'6
Commentators point to a number of constraints on Delaware's ability to
attract corporations by watering down regulations on corporate directors and
controlling shareholders to an undesirable degree. One cynical theory postulates
that Delaware has an interest in providing minority shareholder protections
because the resulting litigation and extra planning creates work for the state's
corporate bar. 67
Another theory holds that the Delaware legislature and courts are limited in
their protection of corporate directors and controlling shareholders by their
concern that a backlash could provoke Congress to adopt federal standards.'6 1
Under this view, it is no coincidence that the 2003 Chancery Court decision in
Disney-which allowed continuation of the highly publicized litigationfollowed both the corporate scandals at Enron, Worldcom and other companies in
2001 and 2002 and the Congressional reaction to those scandals with the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Indeed, as previously suggested,
the one partial victory for the plaintiffs in Citigroup may be understood in this
light. Specifically, this decision coincides with widespread public disgust at the
large pay packages awarded to managers, like Charles Prince, whose actions led
to bailouts at financial institutions. 69
The most important constraint from a normative standpoint, however, lies in
the theory that the reticence of shareholders to invest in corporations formed
under state laws that provide inadequate protection of their interest will deter
companies from incorporating in states with suboptimal corporate laws.o70 This
theory is not without its critics."' What is also important for purposes of this
Article is that this theory largely focuses on protecting minority shareholders,
rather than other parties who may be injured by management decisions.' 72 This,
in turn, brings us to the ability of corporate law to protect non-shareholder
interests injured by directors, including by the directors' failure to prevent
excessive risk-taking.
165. E.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974).
166. Id. at 683-84 (pointing to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision refusing to find liability upon
inattentive directors in Graham v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), as evidence of the
Delaware Supreme Court's seeking to attract corporate charters).
167. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
CorporateLw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
168. Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588 (2003).
169. See Puzzanghera & Zimmerman, supra note 54.
170. E.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
171. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992).
172. Id.
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2. ShareholderPrimacy
Debates over whether the purpose of a business corporation is to maximize
shareholder wealth (within the limits of the law), or to advance the interests of all
stakeholders in the firm (including creditors, employees and the broader
community), often occur at such a level of abstraction as to make one wonder if
there is any real legal impact. Even when the debate turns to the concrete
question of whether directors breach their duty toward shareholders by acting to
advance the interest of other stakeholders-the issue in the classic Dodge
case 173 - the board's vast discretion under the business judgment rule removes
much of the practical importance of the question.174 Nevertheless, the role of
shareholder interests is so central to the structural and philosophical
underpinnings of corporate law that it produces a real impact on the ability of
corporate law to protect the interests of other stakeholders in the corporation.
The primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law manifests itself in a
variety of critical ways when it comes to the tools for curbing excessive risktaking. Short of insolvency, courts generally hold that directors lack any duty in
corporate law to look out for the interests of other stakeholders in the
Reinforcing this narrow view of duty, the law grants to
corporation. 75
shareholders, and not to other stakeholders, standing to sue for breach of duties
under corporate law-at least unless the corporation is insolvent.'76 Also,
shareholder approval can significantly lower the degree of scrutiny applied by the
court to the compensation of directors. 7 Last, but certainly not least, corporate
law places the power to select the directors in the hands of the shareholders.
This is not to say that those creating corporate law think corporations and
their managers should run roughshod over the interests of others impacted by
corporate actions. Instead, the issue is whether these are problems that corporate
law should address, rather than problems for other laws to handle. Pervasive in
corporate law is the notion that, except for certain abuses of limited liability,17
the protection of other stakeholders is the job of other laws.'" Hence, the

173. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
174. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real about Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to
ProfessorGreenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (2002).
175. E.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
176. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (granting shareholders standing to bring a derivative action on behalf
of the corporation).
177. E.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979) (shareholder approval of compensation
reduces review to the waste standard).
178. See note 75 supra.
179. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is used to protect creditors from the abuse of limited
liability through fraud, removal of assets from the corporation, and, for tort victims, externalization of accident
costs through inadequate capitalization. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, PiercingPiercing:An Attempt to Lift the Veil
of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercingthe CorporateVeil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853 (1997).
180. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991). But
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overriding view of those creating and enforcing corporate law is to leave it to
employment, labor, and occupational safety laws to protect workers; to consumer
protection and contract laws to protect customers; to environmental and other
laws to protect the community; and to banking law to protect depositors.
Indeed, given the free choice regime for state corporate law, it is difficult to
see how the system could be otherwise. After all, who chooses the state of
incorporation? While directors may desire a state law regime that grants them
discretion to consider the interests of stakeholders beyond the shareholders,
directors are unlikely to favor a regime which increases their potential problems
by adding to those who might sue directors for breach of duty or might claim the
right to vote on their removal.
Moreover, to the extent corporate law protects anyone other than directors in
the decision of where to incorporate through the right to vote, or to vote with
one's feet, it is the shareholders. In the case of a reincorporation of a firm
incorporated in one state to become a corporation organized under the laws of
another state-a common route by which Delaware corporations are formed
when companies go public, or later'"'-it is the shareholders, not other
stakeholders, who get a vote.182 It is the prospective shareholders who can refuse
to invest based upon undesirable corporate law-a prospect arguably made
realistic, even for the prospective shareholder ignorant of the intricacies of
various state corporate law rules, by the impounding of the expected impact of
these rules into the price of shares traded on efficient markets.'83 Hence, state
corporate law inexorably must focus on shareholder interests to the extent it does
not bow before management interests.
All of this produces a system in which corporate law rules are permissive in
the sense that they become viewed largely as default rules that shareholders can
contract around.14 Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware's General Corporation Law is
a good example. As discussed above, this provision played a critical role in the
dismissal in Citigroup, and provides a much weaker approach to liability for
inattention than found in banking law. It became the governing law for Citigroup
because the shareholders of Citigroup (or its predecessors) voted to amend its
certificate to add a waiver allowed by Section 102(b)(7) or bought into a
corporation with this in its charter. Yet, before the shareholders could make this

see Macey & O'Hara,supra note 37, at 102 (advocating a different rule for banks under which bank directors
would have a fiduciary duty toward fixed claimants, such as depositors).
181. E.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 709
(1987).
182. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 171, at n. 143.
183. E.g., Winter, supra note 170, at 277. Perhaps publicly traded bonds might have a similar effect, but
such an impact seems less plausible as one starts dealing with bank depositors.
184. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416 (1989). But see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1480
(1989) (arguing that mandatory rules should govem some aspects of public corporations, such as fiduciary
duties).
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choice, they made another: They either voted to become a Delaware corporation
or bought into a Delaware corporation. Section 102(b)(7) stems from a third
choice as well: Knowing that shareholders and those who would be directors
decide where to incorporate, the Delaware state legislature voted to amend the
state's corporate law to add Section 102(b)(7).
Of course, Section 102(b)(7) is not without limits. Shareholders cannot
waive claims for breach of the duty of loyalty or for acts not in good faith. On
the other hand, one strongly suspects that shareholders who agree to waive
liability for actions in which directors acted disloyally or in bad faith must not
have understood the impact of the waiver. Hence, this limit may be little more
than the corporate law equivalent to the notion that commercially unreasonable
terms buried in the fine print of an adhesion contract that no one read may not be
enforceable."' Also, Section 102(b)(7) excludes claims for excessive dividends
and the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that knowingly approving illegal
conduct by the corporation violates the duty to act in good faith' 16-both of which
establish some protection of non-shareholder interests through corporate law that
shareholders cannot waive. The instance of excessive dividends, however, is an
elementary abuse of limited liability and it is presumably not worth the political
capital to lobby for shareholders to possess the ability to waive corporate claims
against directors who get caught engaged in illegal actions.
The various manifestations of shareholder primacy relevant to the tools of
limiting excessive risk would be well and good if we assume that shareholder
interests with respect to acceptable risk in a financial institution are consistent
with societal interests. This, however, brings us back to the earlier discussion of
the necessity for regulation of banks and other financial firms rather than relying
on the shareholders' self-interest in avoiding failure as sufficient protection
against excessive risk. As discussed previously, underlying the existence of
banking and other financial firm regulation is recognition of disconnects between
shareholder and societal interests with respect to acceptable risks.
V. CONCLUSION
In comparing state created and enforced corporate law with banking and
other national regulatory regimes, it is important not to fall victim to a "nirvana
fallacy" of assuming the other system is always better. In fact, banking and
financial regulatory regimes performed poorly in the years leading up to the
financial crisis'17 and some of this failure, no doubt, reflects structural
weaknesses. Specifically, banking and other regulatory regimes are subject to

185. E.g., HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICE AND CREDIT
REGULATION § 191 (2009).
186. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 67.
187. E.g., Richard A. Posner, FinancialRegulatory Reform: The Politics of Denial, 6 ECONOMISTS'
VOICE 1, 3 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss1/artl.
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industry capture resulting, among other factors, from the revolving door
phenomenon of individuals moving from the regulated private sector to
regulatory agencies and back to the regulated private sector again,"' and from
campaign contributions to elected officials from the regulated firms."'9 More
fundamentally, it may be asking too much for regulatory agencies, whose heads
are political appointees, and whose budgets are subject to political process, to
maintain rigorous enforcement in the face of a pervasive deregulatory philosophy
among elected officials and the electorate at large.'90
Perhaps the ultimate conclusion is that there are structural weaknesses in
both state corporate law as well as banking and regulatory regimes that render
each a poor reed on which to rely to prevent excessive risk-taking by financial
firms. If so, then the conclusion may simply be that societies are doomed to
endlessly repeat the cycle of excessive risk-taking and financial panic that
stretches back at least eight hundred years. '' In that event, the contribution of
this Article is entirely academic, but not unimportant, one of contributing to our
understanding of the inherent limits of the law.
On the other hand, the traditions of this form of scholarship demand a
normative proposal rather than simply a depressing pathology. Therefore, let us
assume that changes can be made in order to avoid excessive risk-taking so that
next time will be different. The question then becomes which law provides a
better platform on which to work to make such changes. Put differently, in
which law, corporate or banking, are the problems less structural and the
necessary changes less difficult, and with less potential for unintended
consequences?
There have been proposals in the past to end the "race to the bottom" in
corporate law by enacting a national corporate law regime.' 92 There also have
been proposals to change the shareholder focus of corporate law by establishing
duties toward other stakeholders in the company.m9 This could change the
underlying structure of corporate law, which currently renders it inherently weak
in using available tools to curb excessive risk-taking by financial firms. On the
other hand, there are strong arguments against adopting such proposals for

188. E.g., Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, Op-Ed.,The Recession is Over-for Now, N.Y. TIMES Sept.
20, 2009, at WK9.
189. E.g., Frank Rich, Op-Ed., Hollywood's Brilliant Coda to America's Dark Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2009, at WK9 (observing that financial reform has been embattled on Capitol Hill, where the financial
industry has spent $344 million on lobbying in the first three quarters of 2009).
190. Wayne Strumpfer, Address at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Symposium:
Local to Global: Rethinking Spheres of Authority after a World Financial Crisis (Oct. 16-17, 2009).
191. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF
FINANCIAL FOLLY xxviii (2009).
192.
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193. E.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
CorporateLaw as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 581, 606-07 (2002).
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corporations generally.19 4 While the exploration of these arguments is well
beyond the scope of this Article, their existence seemingly counsels for a more
focused approach: If the problem lies with financial firms, then a solution limited
to financial firms (in other words using banking law) seems wise.
By contrast, while also getting well beyond the scope of this Article, the
problems of regulatory capture might be addressed, for example, by greater
limitations on revolving door regulator-to-regulated employment,' by an overlap
of regulatory jurisdiction, or even by borrowing a page from corporate and
securities law and facilitating private enforcement actions. Of course, these
actions might have unintended negative consequences,' 97 but the question is a
relative one of whether the potential untoward consequences are less than those
possible from upending the key traditions of general corporate law for all
companies.
Moreover, having banking law use all the available tools to curb excessive
risk-taking, because state general corporate law is inherently weak, does not
mean that banking law must provide the exclusive source of law. One could, as
Congress did in enacting Section 1821(k), leave corporate law in play for those
cases in which, perhaps, corporate law is more aggressive in curbing excessive
risk than the banking law.
The bottom line is that banking legislation and banking regulators should
move aggressively to use all the tools to curb excessive risk-taking, rather than
rely on state general corporate law. To see how this might play out in concrete
examples, we return one last time to Citigroup.
Beginning with compensation that promotes excessive risk-taking, cynics
might suspect that the Delaware Chancery Court in Citigroup had in the back of
its mind forestalling federal action in the area when it allowed the claim to
proceed on the ex-CEO's termination package. Regardless, the lesson of this
Article is that the Federal Reserve was wise, in its recent proposal to regulate
compensation, not to wait on state corporate law to address the problem.
Turning to the subject of liability for unreasonable risking taking, Congress
already moved to a fair extent in this area in Section 1821(k) of the FIRREA. As
discussed above, this section creates a minimum national standard for imposing
liability on grossly negligent directors in actions brought by the FDIC on behalf
194. E.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 9 (1993) (arguing that the
ability to chose corporate law through incorporating in Delaware has benefitted shareholders); Comm. On
Corporate Laws, Am. Bar Ass'n, Other ConstituenciesStatutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253,
2269 (1990) (discussing problems with extending directors' fiduciary duty to benefit constituencies other than
the shareholders).
195. E.g., Boone & Johnson, supra note 188.
196. E.g., James D. Cox, Professor of Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Address at the University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Symposium: Local to Global: Rethinking Spheres of Authority after a World
Financial Crisis (Oct. 16-17, 2009).
197. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1465,
1466-67 (2004) (arguing that private securities fraud class actions are often meritless and brought to extort
settlement).
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of failed banks. Significantly, part of the motivation for this provision lay in
Congress' concern about states watering down liability standards in the wave of
state corporate law legislation of which Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law was a part.' 8 The problem is that Section 1821(k) does
not go far enough. It leaves the matter with state corporate law until the FDIC
asserts an action in the right of a receiver of a failed bank or when FDIC money
is used to save the bank. Even putting aside liability for directors and officers of
a holding company (as in Citigroup) rather than a bank, by waiting to trigger the
federal standard until the bank fails or the FDIC saves the bank, the statute leaves
a gaping hole when a financial firm is bailed out by the Treasury Department or
the Federal Reserve (rather than the FDIC) on the grounds it is "too big to fail."'"
Indeed, this avoidance of more liability-conducive federal standards may
compound the moral hazard problem in the too big to fail notion.
Finally, and most radically, perhaps it is necessary to rethink the importation
for financial corporations of the corporate law norm that shareholders possess the
exclusive power to elect directors. Germany and some other nations use a system
in which employees have the right to elect a certain number of directors to the
board.2 00 Perhaps a system in which bondholders, depositors, or the like, can
elect a certain number of directors could temper the moral hazard afflicting
financial corporations.20 1
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